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MAKING AMERICA "THE LAND OF SECOND
CHANCES":* RESTORING SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
FOR EX-OFFENDERS
DEBORAH N. ARCHERt & KELE S. WILLIAMS**

"I have been clean now for three years and six months with
G[o]d's help, and I am trying to stay that way, but with no help for
people like me it is very hard not to go back to that way of life.
I want people to realize that is why people do time, get out and do
it again. They can't survive any other way. "I

-Statement

of ex-offender from Pennsylvania
INTRODUCTION

Virtually every felony conviction carries with it a life sentence. Upon being
released from prison, ex-offenders face a vast and increasingly unnavigable
maze of mandatory exclusions from valuable social programs and employment opportunities. These twists and turns-exclusions, ranging from restrictions on the ability to get a driver's license 2 to a lifetime federal welfare eligibility ban 3 -impede their hopes of success in the free world. Defenders of

collateral sanctions justify most of them as preventive, as "exist[ing] in order to
protect society from the ex-offender's corrupting influence, and [as] prevent[ing]
the commission of future offenses by ex-offenders." 4 However, in adopting this
array of civil disabilities, federal, state, and municipal governments have
*President George H.W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2O04/01/20040120-7.html ("America is the land of
second chance [sic]-and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better
life.").
tAssociate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., Smith College, 1993; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1996. The authors wish to thank Anthony Alfieri, Richard Buery, Stephen Ellmann, Seth
Harris, Damon Hewitt, Maja Hazell, Dennis Parker, and Zolton Williams for their thoughtful and
helpful comments on earlier drafts. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance provided by Natasha Neal, Alice Neal, Erica Zieschang, and Rebecca Elin, and the
summer research grant provided by New York Law School.
**Assistant Professor of Clinical Education, University of Miami School of Law. B.S., Cornell
University, 1994; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1998.
1. Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denialof Benefits to Drug
Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 37, 42-43 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)

(citation omitted).
2. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 10549 and accompanying text.
4. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 161 (1999) [hereinafter Demleitner,
Preventing Internal Exile] (internal quotation omitted).
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endorsed a social policy that condemns ex-offenders to a diminished social and
economic status. For many, it means a life of crime. 5 Recently, the American
Bar Association concluded that:
The dramatic increase in the numbers of persons convicted and imprisoned
means that this half-hidden network of legal barriers affects a growing
proportion of the populace. More people convicted inevitably means more
people who will ultimately be released from prison or supervision,
and who must either successfully reenter society or be at risk of reoffending .... If promulgated and administered indiscriminately, a regime of
collateral consequences may frustrate the chance of successful re-entry
into the community, and thereby encourage recidivism.6
In this article, we argue that advocates must engage in a comprehensive
litigation attack on reentry barriers to dismantle this crippling web of collateral
sanctions and to restore the full citizenship of ex-offenders. 7 We argue that in
light of unfavorable federal law, litigation under state law theories provides the
best hope for relief. While legal advocacy aimed at helping ex-offenders
surmount existing barriers to housing, employment, and other basic necessities is
an invaluable step, collateral sanctions will continue to have a devastating impact
on individuals and their communities unless resources are directed at changing
these policies. A state-specific litigation strategy, coordinated with legislative
and public education efforts, achieves that goal either through outright victory in
8
the courts or, even if unsuccessful, will exert pressure on the political process.
Part I of this article briefly explores the problem of collateral sanctions and
their impact on individual offenders, families, and communities.9 Part II
5. See Jeremy Travis, Laurie 0. Robinson & Amy L. Solomon, PrisonerReentry: Issues for
PracticeandPolicy, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2002, at 12, 12.
6. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 8-10 (3rd ed. 2004) (citiations omitted).

7. See Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile supra note 4, at 158-59 (arguing that loss of
economic and social rights, as well as the loss of political rights, denies ex-offenders the indicia
of citizenship).
8. To illustrate, the Georgia Supreme Court, in the closely-decided Stephens v. State, upheld a
provision imposing a mandatory life term for two-time drug offenders in the face of statistics
showing that the statute had a severe discriminatory impact on African Americans. 456 S.E.2d
560, 561 (Ga. 1995). Justice Thompson, in his concurrence, explicitly called on the legislature to
reconsider the law in light of the fact that "only a true cynic can look at these statistics and not be
impressed that something is amiss." Id. at 564. "The court's decision shifted the debate to the
halls of the legislature where something remarkable happened: Despite political trends towards
ever-tougher penalties for drug crimes, the legislature eliminated the mandatory life term for twotime drug offenders, thereby defusing the explosive issue raised in Stephens." James P. Fleissner,
CriminalLaw and Procedure:A Two-Year Survey, 48 MERCER L. REV. 219, 220 (1996).
9. This article focuses on "socioeconomic rights," which we define as barriers that impede an
individual's ability to support herself and/or to utilize the social safety net. These barriers include
employment policies which discriminate against ex-offenders, denials of financial assistance for
education, evictions and exclusions of ex-offenders and their families from public housing, and
denials of welfare assistance and food stamps. There are at least two other significant civil
disabilities resulting from a felony conviction: felony disenfranchisement laws, and state laws
encouraging termination of parental rights as a consequence of incarceration. See generally THE
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examines existing reentry barriers, focusing on those that eliminate the economic
opportunities of ex-offenders. Part III explores the limitations of federal causes
of action and legislative advocacy in achieving widespread, substantive reform.
Finally, in part IV, we argue that the most effective means of attacking the maze
of collateral sanctions is by focusing on state-by-state litigation, particularly
encouraging advocates to hone in on states with extensive, yet vulnerable mazes
of collateral sanctions and constitutional provisions that could support such
challenges.
I.
EX-OFFENDER REENTRY AND THE IMPACT OF COLLATERAL SANCTIONS

To prevent recidivism and afford ex-offenders a second chance, the
government must facilitate an ex-offender's successful transition back into her
community. As one commentator has noted:
Prisoners have historically returned to the communities from which they
were sentenced, generally to live with family members, attempt to find a
job, and successfully avoid future criminality. The world to which they
return is drastically different from the one they left regarding availability
of jobs, family support, community resources, and willingness to assist exoffenders. 10
To make this transition, an ex-offender must have access to the tools
necessary to construct self-sufficiency-social service programs, educational
assistance, and employment opportunities. Only then may she navigate through
a changed and often hostile society.1 1 Thus, it is not surprising that, each year,
an increasing number of ex-offenders-those ill-equipped to face these
challenges-are denied access to these tools and lost in transition.
Saddled with collateral consequences, ex-offenders often return to the illegal
practices that initially led to their convictions. 12 As one commentator noted,
SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT

LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES

(2004),

http://www.sentencingproject
.org/pdfs/1046.pdf, Philip M. Genty, ProceduralDue Process Rights of IncarceratedParents in
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings:A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757 (1991).

While such laws also undermine an ex-offender's ability to successfully reintegrate into the
community, they are beyond the scope of this article.
10. Karen R. Kadela & Richard P. Seiter, PrisonerReentry: What Works, What Does Not,
and What Is Promising,49 CRIME & DELINQ. 360, 361 (2003).
11. See JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY SOLOMON & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME 18

(2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from-prison-to.home.pdf (noting that
"heightened stress levels at the time of release reflect very real anxieties about
successfully managing a return to the outside world"); Kathleen M. Olivares, Velmer S.
Burton, Jr. & Francis T. Cullen, The CollateralConsequences of a Felony Conviction: A National
Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10, 10 (1996)
("Upon release, incarcerated offenders often encounter barriers to successful reintegration
involving stigma, loss of job opportunities, friendships, familial relationships, and denial of legal
and civil rights.").
12. See Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil DisqualificationsAttending Conviction: A
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"[t]he ex-offender population has tended to recidivate due in part to an
unavailability of economic and social supports."' 13 According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, "[o]f the 272,111 persons released from prison in [fifteen]
States in 1994, an estimated 67.5 [percent] were rearrested for a felony or
serious misdemeanor within [three] years, 46.9 [percent] were reconvicted,
and 25.4 [percent were] resentenced to prison for a new crime." 14
15
Drug offenders bear a disproportionate burden of collateral consequences.
Many collateral sanctions were created as part of the "war on drugs" and apply
solely to drug offenses. 16 As a result of legislative activity primarily over the
past decade, an individual with any drug-related felony (including nonviolent
offenses) may have to manage her own reentry into society. At the same time,
17
she may be: (1) banned from living with her family in public housing;
(2) denied eligibility for federal welfare and food stamp benefits; 18 (3) subjected
20
19
to limits on financial aid for higher education; (4) suspended from driving;
and, (5) and faced with far reaching restrictions on employment opportunities. 2 1 Such barriers have created an absurd result: ex-offenders convicted of
rape or murder are nonetheless eligible for a number of rights denied to drug
22
offenders.
What's more, collateral sanctions also have profound economic and social

Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 605 (1997) ("The more that convicted
persons are restricted by law from pursuing legitimate occupations, the fewer opportunities they
will have for remaining law abiding.").
13. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255, 259 (2004).
14. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Offender Statistics
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2005).
15. The makeup of released prisoners has changed substantially over the past two decades.
There has been a dramatic rise in the number of Americans imprisoned for drug-related offenses as
a result of the "war on drugs." Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 1, at 37. Arrests for drug
offenses have nearly tripled since 1980, and more than four-fifths of these arrests have been for
drug possession. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drugs and Crime Facts,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/dcf/enforce.htm#drug (last updated Oct. 17, 2005). As of February
2006, federal prisons held 92,342 drug offenders, who made up 53.4 percent of all inmates.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Quick Facts, http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp
(last updated February 25, 2006) [hereinafter Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Quick Facts]. This is up
from 45,367 drug offenders in 1994. Id. Almost one-quarter of the total incarcerated population in
the United States (including those in local jails and state and federal prisons) are incarcerated as a
result of drug convictions. JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE:
THE RACIAL COSTS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

13 (2000).

16. Marc Mauer, Introduction: The CollateralConsequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1491, 1494 (2003) [hereinafter Mauer, CollateralConsequences].
17. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
22. Nora V. Demleitner, "CollateralDamage": No Re-entryfor Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 1027, 1033 (2002) [hereinafter Demleitner, CollateralDamage].
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repercussions for ex-offenders' families and communities. 2 3 Whereas the punishment resulting from a felony conviction once focused primarily on the
offender, 24 the consequences have a far broader impact today. Obstacles to reintegration cause profound stress on community institutions and local resources,
25
leaving communities without sufficient resources to tackle other problems.
Moreover, a failed reintegration itself means added costs for public health,
child welfare, public safety and criminal justice.
The devastating impact of collateral consequences on entire communities
becomes increasingly important as the prison population continues to balloon.
26
Approximately 600,000 people are released from prisons and jails every year.
27
Mass incarceration of nonviolent offenders resulting from the war on drugs,
from tough-on-crime stances at the state and federal level,28 and from a decline
in judicial sentencing discretion 2 9 have increased the numbers of inmates who
will be released into their communities. "In 2005, 6.9 million people were
on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole." 30 By the end of 2003, state and
31
federal prison authorities had 1,470,045 adult inmates under their jurisdiction.
"If recent incarceration rates remain unchanged, an estimated [one] of every
32
[fifteen] persons... will serve time in a prison during their lifetime."
These individuals return to a relatively small number of disadvantaged urban
communities, 33 which often have disproportionately high amounts of poverty,
unemployment, homelessness, and instability. 34 In these neighborhoods, the
23. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
24. Mauer & Chesney-Lind, Introduction to INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 1.

25. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 285-88 (outlining some of the challenges facing
communities with many reentering residents).
26. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic, and
Social Consequences, SENT'G & CORRECTIONS (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice), Nov.
9, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/184253.pdf.

27. See Olivares, Burton & Cullen, supra note 11 at 10 (stating that the war on drugs and
America's "imprisonment binge" have resulted in a state prison population that exceeds one
million).
28. See id. (noting that the "get tough movement" has had a profound impact on the criminal

justice system).
29. See Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 1491-92 (arguing that the

explosion in the prison population was largely the result of "increasing controls on judicial
discretion," including mandatory sentencing and "three strikes and you're out" policies).
30. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2005-2008 6

(2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bjssp08.pdf.
31. Id.

32. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Offender Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 2005).
33. Travis, Robinson & Solomon, supra note 5, at 12.
34. For example, in New York, African Americans and Latinos from the New York City

communities of Harlem, Washington Heights, the Lower East Side, the South and East Bronx,
Central and East Brooklyn, and Southeast Queens represent eighty percent of the state's
prison population. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND., FREE THE VOTE 1 (2003), available at

http://naacpldf.org/content/pdf/felon/Freethe_Votebrochure.pdf. Similarly, fifty-nine percent of
all men and women released from Maryland prisons returned to Baltimore City, a community in
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arrest, incarceration, and recidivism of large numbers of people place a severe
35
burden on the formal and informal institutions that sustain the communities.
Overburdened and resource-strapped communities are less likely to have the
means to provide the social services and economic support that those returning
home from prison so desperately need. 36 Employment restrictions on exoffenders combined with the incarceration of recidivist offenders unable to make
a legitimate living means an extraction of members from the potential pool of
workers in the community. In turn, this reduces the chances that the community
can become economically vibrant. In short, there is a vicious cycle in which the
vast majority of ex-offenders burden economically depressed communities illequipped to deal with their tremendous needs.
The spiraling consequences of collateral sanctions are especially critical in
the African American and other minority communities. 3 7 Nationwide, African
Americans are incarcerated at 8.2 times the rate of Whites. 3 8 Approximately
nine percent of all African American males in their late-twenties are in prison or
jail, compared to one percent of Whites in the same age group. 3 9 Of the almost
190,000 federal inmates, more than 75,000-nearly forty percent-are African
American. 40 And the war on drugs has only exacerbated preexisting racial
disparities within the prison population. To be sure, people of color are
disproportionately imprisoned for drug offenses: eighty percent of those
41
imprisoned for drug offenses in state facilities are African American or Latino.
Notwithstanding the fact that African Americans constitute only twelve percent
of illegal drug users in the United States, they represent forty-four percent of
those arrested for drug crimes and fifty-six percent of those convicted for drug
crimes. 42 This imbalance is largely the result of policy decisions about where
and how to prosecute the war on drugs.4 3 A disproportionate impact on families
which 22.9 percent of residents live below the poverty line.
KACHNOWSKI,

URBAN INST.,

NANCY G. LA VIGNE & VERA

A PORTRAIT OF PRISONER REENTRY IN MARYLAND 51 (2003),

availableat http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410655_MDPortraitReentry.pdf.

35. See Kadela & Seiter, supra note 10, at 380.
36. See id.

37. In Maryland, of the fifty-nine percent of all released prisoners returning

to

Baltimore City, eighty-nine percent of those are African American. LA VIGNE & KACHNOWSKI,
supra note 34, at 51.
38. FELLNER, supra note 15, at 9. See also Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels,
Statutory Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1501, 1502 (2003) ("African Americans are at least seven times more likely than [W]hites,
and two times more likely than [Latinos], to be incarcerated.").
39. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999, at 9 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p99.pdf.
40. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Quick Facts, supra note 15.
41. Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 50, 53.
42. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 265.
43. See Mauer, Mass Imprisonment, supra note 41, at 53 ("A considerable body of research
documents that these figures are not necessarily the result of greater drug use in minority
communities, but rather drug policies that have employed a law enforcement approach in
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of color is also evident in the number of incarcerated African American
parents. 44 "Among both [s]tate and [f]ederal prisoners with minor children,
African-Americans compose[] the largest racial/ethnic group." 4 5 Thus, incarceration disproportionately tears African American families apart, while
collateral consequences make successful reunification near impossible. In sum,
the disproportionate arrest and incarceration of African Americans exacerbates
racial stratification when combined with punitive collateral consequences.
Women, many of whom are parents, also suffer disproportionately as a
result of collateral sanctions. According to the U.S. Department of Justice's
Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 1999, just under 1.5 million children in the United
States had a parent in prison, an increase of more than half-a-million
since 1991.46 Women-more so than men-are dramatically impacted by
drug policies. 4 7 In 1999, drug offenders accounted for the largest source of total
growth among female inmates, 48 a group which had recently experienced a more
than sixfold increase. (The female inmate population rose from 12,000 in 1980
to more than 90,000 in 1999. 49 ) Within the ballooning group of incarcerated
women, one-third of them are currently serving a drug sentence. 50 This increase
in number of imprisoned women, is, on the whole, devastating for women and
their families. This is especially the case when combined with collateral
sanctions affecting economic rights. For instance, women with criminal records
are more likely than their male counterparts to have minor children and to have
had custody of those children prior to incarceration. 5 1 These women are also
more likely to have been the victims of physical or sexual abuse both as a child
and as an adult, and to suffer from drug or alcohol addiction as a result of that
abuse. 52 Women in state and federal prisons are also overwhelmingly poor and

communities of color and a treatment orientation in [W]hite and suburban neighborhoods.").
44. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND

THEIR CHILDREN 3 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf (finding that

nearly half of all imprisoned parents are African American, and only one-quarter are White).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2 (stating that in 1999, state and federal prisons held approximately 721,500 parents
of minor children).

47. There are also racial disparities among the women being incarcerated. From 1974
through 2001, "adult [African American] females were [2.5] times more likely than adult [Latinas]
and [5.5] times more likely than adult [W]hite females to have ever served time in State or
[flederal prison." THOMAS BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001 5 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
piusp01 .pdf.
48. BECK, supra note 39, at 10.
49. Meda Chesney-Lind, Imprisoning Women: The Unintended Victims of Mass
Imprisonment, in Invisible Punishment, supra note 1, at 79, 80.
50. Mauer & Chesney-Lind, Introductionto INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
51. Amy E. Hirsch, Battered Women, Battered Again: The Impact of Women's Criminal
Records, in CIVIL PENALTIES SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 85, 85 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller

eds., 2005).
52. Id.
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poorly educated.5 3 Approximately twenty percent of mothers in state prison
were homeless in the year prior to their incarceration and seventy percent had
54
incomes of less than 1000 dollars in the month preceding their incarceration.
Welfare benefits and public housing are critical resources to help these women
get back on their feet. Nonetheless, for ex-offenders, collateral sanctions render
those resources unavailable. For many, the only
option is to return to abusive
55
shelter.
and
food
for
exchange
in
relationships
Most jurisdictions somewhat provide for the eventual removal of various
collateral sanctions. However, the removal of sanctions does not address the
critical period following release, during which ex-offenders and their families
most desperately need temporary supports and employment opportunities.
56
To be sure, relief mechanisms are generally unduly burdensome or ineffective,
and economic and social service restrictions are "generally not affected when
civil rights are restored."' 57 As a result, many ex-offenders return to a life of
crime and return to prison before they are eligible to seek relief from
58
the penalties.
II.
EXISTING REENTRY BARRIERS

American law has a long tradition of "civil disabilities," which have
effectively denied ex-felons and others the right to participate in civic life (i.e.,
have prevented them from serving on juries, voting, holding public office,
entering into contracts, or participating in civil litigation).5 9 These examples
of civil disabilities are somewhat akin to today's collateral sanctions. Like
collateral sanctions, civil disabilities hamper ex-offenders' attempts to reintegrate into the community. 60 Historically, "most were acknowledged as a
'deserved' consequence of and as proportional in severity to an individual's

53. Id. at 87.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section ofthe Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1718-19 (2003).

57. Id. at 1719.
58. See Petersilia, supra note 26, at 3 ("Most rearrests occur in the first [six] months after

release. Fully two-thirds of all parolees are rearrested within [three] years.").
59. See Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques
of Social Policy, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 51, at 9;
Demleitner, Preventing InternalExile, supra note 4, at 155. It should be noted that many of these

civil disabilities-particularly disenfranchisement-were adopted as part of a scheme of racial
subordination, particularly in the South.

See Gabriel Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the

Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, in CIVIL

PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES,

supra note 51, at 27, 29-32; Andrew Shapiro, Challenging CriminalDisenfranchisementunder the
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L. J. 537, 537-42 (1993).
60. See Mele & Miller, supra note 59, at 9.
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breach of the social contract," 6 1 or were clearly linked to the crime committed.6 2
Civil disabilities decreased in number and in severity during the 1960s and
1970s, but this lull did not last long. 63 In the 1980s and 1990s, the war on drugs
and the "get tough on crime" movement led to the enactment of harsher
collateral consequences 64 that are "grossly disproportionate and noticeably
disconnected from" the crimes to which they are attached.6 5
A review of the extent, range, and interplay of these sanctions is necessary
to assess the viability of any proposed legal challenge. It is only through such an
examination that one can see how collateral consequences can devastate the lives
of ex-offenders and, conversely, how collateral consequences lack any sound
policy rationale.
A. Employment Opportunities
Upon release, an ex-offender often has difficulty finding legitimate
66
employment since she frequently lacks marketable job skills or a work history,
and also faces discrimination by employers against former offenders. Statistics
show that sixty percent of former inmates have still not found legitimate
employment a year after being released.6 7 Why? Licensing restrictions have
generally been justified as essential "to foster high professional standards," while
restrictions on employment opportunities are said to ensure that those hired have
"good moral character." 68 Employment-related sanctions have also been held
out as preventive measures: "[s]ince organizations and employers are generally
considered responsible for their employees, they must be allowed access to
applicants' backgrounds and have the right to exclude those who present a danger to society as measured by their prior record."'69 These restrictions are
imposed not only for positions requiring specialized training, but for jobs typically held by workers with minimal educational and work experience. As the
availability of low-skilled jobs declines, the economic consequences of collateral
sanctions that restrict employment opportunities will escalate for ex-offenders,
70
their families, and their communities.
61. Id. at 9-10.

62. Id. at 10 ("Other disabilities were largely precautionary measures, employed to protect
the public from the possibility of ex-felons further breaching laws. These penalties tended to be
explicitly connected to the original criminal culpability of the offender.").
63. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 4, at 155.

64. See Patricia Allard, Claiming our Rights: ChallengingPostconviction Penalties Using an
InternationalHuman Rights Framework, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note
51, at 223, 225-26 [hereinafter Allard, Claiming our Rights]; Demleitner, PreventingInternal

Exile, supra note 4, at 155; Mele & Miller, supra note 59, at 10.
65. Mele &. Miller, supra note 59, at 10.
66. See Kadela & Seiter, supra note 10, at 367.
67. See Petersilia, supra note 26, at 3.
68. Demleitner, Preventing InternalExile, supra note 4, at 156 (internal quotations omitted).

69. Id. at 161.
70. See id. at 156.
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One of the primary employment restrictions facing ex-offenders is the
prohibition against public employment. 7 1 Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina permanently deny convicted felons the
right to public employment. 72 The other forty-five states "permit public employment of convicted felons in varying degrees." 73 Some states also impose or
allow restrictions on hiring or licensing ex-offenders or parolees for particular
professions (e.g., law, real estate, medicine, dentistry, engineering, pharmacy,
nursing, physical therapy, and education).7 4
Many states further decrease ex-offenders' employment prospects through
occupational licensing laws that contain character requirements 7 5 that either bear
no direct relation to the licensed occupation or that do not consider the individual
circumstances of the crime for which the applicant was convicted.7 6 Licensing
restrictions not only result in the loss of new employment opportunities, but also
often act as a bar on reemployment in the profession in which the offender
worked before she was convicted. Other ex-offenders find themselves unable to
77
use skills they learned in prison occupational training programs.
Some employment restrictions are grounded in concerns for public safety,
and may therefore be appropriate. As one commentator noted: "[I]t is clear why
persons convicted of child molestation are not permitted to work in day care
centers." 78 However, there is a distinction between sanctions that are adopted
with a goal of preventing future criminal activity and those that are essentially
retributive, 79 as is, perhaps, a bar on ex-offenders becoming licensed as
barbers. 80 A wide range of jobs include restrictions that bear no reasonable
71. See Olivares, Burton & Cullen, supra note 11, at 13.
72. Id.
73. Id. (finding that twelve states apply a "direct relationship test" to determine whether there
is a sufficient relationship between the applicant's criminal record and his ability to perform the
job, seventeen permit public employment after completion of sentence, and ten leave to the
employer the decision whether or not to hire a previously convicted felon).
74. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-6A- 1 (1996) (prohibiting felons from becoming bank directors);
§ 34-24-166 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (allowing State Board of Chiropractic Examiners to deny a
license to a felon); Petersilia, supra note 26, at 4 ("In California, [parolees] are barred from the
law, real estate, medicine, nursing, physical therapy, and education. Colorado prohibits [parolees]
from becoming dentists, engineers, nurses, pharmacists, physicians or real estate agents.").
75. Many federal, state, and municipal laws which do not specifically exclude felons
nonetheless effectively exclude them from obtaining licenses by requiring that the applicant show
"good moral character." See Thompson, supra note 13, at 281 (explaining that when there is no
clear definition of good moral character, licensing boards are given broad discretion in defining the
term, and as a result, the term is often interpreted to bar anyone with a criminal conviction).
76. Demleitner, PreventingInternalExile, supra note 4, at 156; Thompson, supra note 13, at
281.
77. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 282 (noting that "prisons have continued to provide
vocational training to inmates in certain occupations from which they will be barred upon
release").
78. Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 1493.
79. See id.
80. Forty-six states restrict the ability of ex-felons to become licensed as barbers. Bruce
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relationship to the job function or a public safety concern. For example,
depending on the nature of the conviction, New York may deny ex-felons
employment in more than one hundred trades and professions, including
81
barbering, plumbing, real estate, education, health care, and private security.
In Virginia, individuals convicted of a felony may not work as nurses,
funeral directors, pharmacists, optometrists, accountants, or dentists.8 2 And in
Maryland, state agencies and licensing boards have discretion to deny or revoke
a wide range of professional licenses, including those for barbers, 83 insurance
professionals, 84 accountants,8 5 landscape architects,8 6 plumbers,8 7 and social
88
workers.
While some may see the benefit of allowing employers to discriminate
against convicted felons, it is especially difficult to rationalize such discrimination on the basis of an arrest that did not even result in a conviction. 89 Yet,
this happens in a majority of states: "Thirty-eight states permit all employers

(public and private) and occupational licensing agencies to inquire about and
rely upon arrests that did not result in a conviction." 90
Arkansas, New
Hampshire, and New Mexico forbid public employers to rely on arrests that did
91
not lead to conviction, but permit private employers to do so.
E.May, The CharacterComponent of OccupationalLicensing Laws: A ContinuingBarrier to the
Ex-felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 193 (1995).
81. See Fox Butterfield, Freedfrom Prison, but Still Paying a Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2002, at 18. Avi Brisman explains further that:
[I]n New York, depending on the nature of one's criminal history, an ex-offender may
be prohibited from gaining employment in any place beer or liquor is sold for drinking
in the place where it is purchased (for example, bars, restaurants), an insurance
adjuster's office, a bank, a billiard parlor, any agency connected with horse racing,
boxing or wrestling; and from receiving a license as an auctioneer, junk dealer,
gunsmith, pharmacist, doctor, physiotherapist, osteopath, podiatrist, dentist, dental
hygienist, veterinarian, certified public accountant, undertaker, embalmer, private
detective, investigator, watch guard, attorney, billiard room operator, notary public,
insurance adjuster, bingo operator, beer or liquor dispenser, real estate broker or
salesman, check casher, and union collector.
Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and Imprisonment for
Sustainable Communities and the Environment, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 423,
433 (2004).
82. See Brisman, supra note 81, at 433.
83. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC.& PROF. § 4-314(a)(1)(viii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
84. See, e.g., MD.CODE ANN., INS. § 10-126(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2003) (insurance providers);
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 10-410(a)(7) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (public adjusters).
85. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC.& PROF. § 2-315(a)(1)(iii) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005).
86. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 9-3 10(a)(l)(iii) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005).
87. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC.& PROF. § 12-312 (LexisNexis 2004).
88. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC.§ 19-311(8) (LexisNexis 2005).
89. As Marc Mauer points out, given the prevalence of racial profiling, one's history of arrest
"may have little to do with involvement in crime but much to do with discriminatory
police behavior." Mauer, CollateralConsequences, supra note 16, at 1494.
90. Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 38, at 1503-04.
91. Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 38, at 1504. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-1-103(c)(1)
(2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1:51 (2001) (forbidding inquiry into applicant's arrest record);
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The loss of driving privileges also acts as an employment barrier. In the
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
1992,92 Congress mandated the withholding of ten percent of federal highway
funds unless a state enacts and enforces a law that revokes or suspends (for six
months) the driver's license of anyone convicted of any drug offense. Federal
funds are not withheld, however, if a governor submits written statement to the
Secretary of the Department of Transportation certifying both that she opposes
the revocation or suspension and that the state legislature has adopted a
resolution expressing its opposition. 93 Today, twenty-three states automatically
revoke or suspend driver's licenses for drug convictions. 94 Of these states,
95
seventeen have suspension periods of at least six months for the first offense.
Delaware, 9 6 Massachusetts, 9 7 and South Carolina 98 revoke or suspend driver's
licenses for more than six months for nondriving drug convictions. That
provisions requiring the suspension or revocation of driving privileges severely

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-2-3(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2000).

92. Pub. L. No. 102-388, 106 Stat. 1520 (1992).
93. 23 U.S.C §§ 159(a)(2)-(3) (2000).
94. See Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 38, at 1516; ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-290-291
(LexisNexis 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-915(b)(1)(A) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
21, § 4177K (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.055 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-75 (2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-4-6 (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321.212(1)(d), 901.5(10)
(West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:430 (2002); 540 MASS. CODE REGS. 20.03 (1996); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.319e(2) (West 2001); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-1-71(1) (West 1999);
Mo ANN. STAT. §§ 577.500, .510 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-16 (West 2005);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4510.17 (Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-205(A)(6) (West 2000 & Supp.
2005); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1532(c)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1745(A) (1991 & Supp. 2005); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.372 (Vernon 1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 53-3-220(1)(c) (2002 & Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-390.1 (2005); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 961.50 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-7-128(f) (2005) (suspending
license for those under the age of nineteen).
95. Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 38, at 1516. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-290 (LexisNexis
2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-915(b)(1)(A) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.055 (West 2001);
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-75(a) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-15 (LexisNexis
2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321.212(1)(d), 901.5(10) (West 2003); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 257.319e(2) (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-1-71(1) (West 1999); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-16 (West 2005); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 1996 & Supp.
2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.17(A) (Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6205.1(B)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1532(c)(1)(i) (West 1996 &
Supp. 2004); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.372(c) (Vernon 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3220(l)(c) (2002 & Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-390.1 (2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.50
(West 1998 & Supp. 2005).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177K (1995 & Supp. 2004) (two year revocation; offenders
permitted to apply for conditional license within six months for misdemeanor offenses and one
year for felony offenses); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4764(b)(1) (2003) (one year revocation for
first offense, with driving privileges restored upon completion of diversion program).
97. 540 MASS. CODE REGS. 20.03 (1996).
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-745(A) (1991 & Supp. 2005) (requiring suspension of license for
controlled substance violation other than one involving marijuana or hashish).
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impact the economic prospects of ex-offenders goes without saying. 9 9 Together,
bans on public employment, occupational licensing restrictions, and the

revocation or suspension of driver's0 0 licenses leave many ex-offenders with little
ability to make a legitimate living.1
B. Public Assistance

Through a series of legislative enactments, Congress has effectively
dismantled the social safety net for ex-offenders and their families. Restrictions

on the right to receive social and welfare benefits, in contrast to restrictions on
civil and political rights, have a direct and potentially devastating impact on the

ex-offender and her family.' 0 ' Denial of subsistence benefits and subsidized
housing makes it harder for ex-offenders both to meet the basic needs of their

families and to exercise the economic and personal autonomy that many take for
granted. 10 2 Many ex-offenders, unable to access public housing or food stamps,
10 3
are unable to create a suitable living environment for their families.

1. Eligibilityfor Temporary Assistancefor Needy Families ("TANF")
Federal welfare laws bar individuals with felony convictions from receiving
welfare benefits or food stamps in the absence of countervailing state legislation.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

("PRWORA") 104 provides that anyone convicted of a state or federal felony
offense involving the use or sale of drugs is permanently ineligible for cash
assistance and food stamps. 10 5 States may "opt out" of this requirement or
10 6
modify the ban.

99. Clearly, such provisions deprive ex-offenders of the mobility necessary to access jobs that
require driving to the place of employment when public transportation is not available, or that
require a driver's license as a prerequisite (e.g., chauffeurs, delivery people, or cab drivers). See
TRAVIS, SOLOMON & WAUL, supra note 11, at 31-33 (explaining why job placement and training
programs for prisoners have not been more successful).
100. See id.
101. See Demleitner, PreventingInternal Exile, supra note 4, at 158.
102. Id. "While the denial of assistance to ex-offenders is not designed to affect the public
support granted other family members, any denial of benefits to one family member necessarily
impacts the others," id., particularly when the individual being denied the benefit is the head of the
household and responsible for meeting the basic needs of others. See, e.g., PATRICIA ALLARD, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE SENTENCES:

DENYING

WELFARE BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED

OF DRUG OFFENSES 10-14 (2002), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/ baltimore/articles

publications/publications/lifesentences/03-18-03atriciaAllardReport.pdf [hereinafter ALLARD,
SENTENCES] (describing impact of denial of benefits to female ex-offenders on children).

103. See

ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES,

LIFE

supra note 103 (describing how women may be forced to

surrender their children to foster care as a result of loss of benefits).
104. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 8, 21, 25, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
105. PRWORA § 115(a) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2000)).
106. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d)(1) (2000). As of 2003: nineteen states had adopted the ban in its
entirety; eleven had opted out entirely; and eighteen had modified the ban by requiring recipients
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As a result of the TANF ban, recently released drug offenders lack transitional income to meet life's basic needs and to care for their children. TANF
provides financial assistance to indigent families with dependent children, while
"[flood stamps are the first line of defense against hunger," providing eligible
low-income households with the means to obtain healthy food. 10 7 To prevent
ex-offenders and their families from receiving TANF and food stamps
undermines efforts at reentry, rehabilitation, reunification of families and
treatment for addiction by making it virtually impossible for them to meet their
10 8
daily needs without returning to a life of crime.
2. Access to Public Housing
Many landlords reject applicants because of criminal history or because of
marred credit or work histories-problems common among ex-offenders. 109 So,
it is not surprising that securing safe and affordable housing has long been a
challenge for ex-offenders. While collateral sanctions are not the basis of all
housing obstacles facing ex-offenders, collateral sanctions are a significant basis.
Indeed, changes in federal housing policy have had a dramatic effect on the
ability of ex-offenders to obtain stable, affordable housing, 1 10 for they often
cause landlords to reject ex-offenders' applications' 1 ' and prevent ex-offenders
from staying with family members who live in public housing.
Under the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996112 and the
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998,113 an ex-offender is
permanently barred from seeking Section 8114 and other federally-assisted
housing if any member of her household is subject to a state sex offender
with drug felony convictions to seek or participate in alcohol or drug treatment to keep their
eligibility or to submit to drug tests, limiting eligibility to those convicted of possession offenses,
etc. Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 38, at 1506-07. Illinois and Massachusetts eliminated the
ban on food stamps but retained, in some form, the ban on cash assistance. Id. at 1507-08.
107. FOOD & NUTRITION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP OUTREACH TOOLKIT 1

(2006), available at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/outreach/pdfs/toolkit/office/3-offices-introduction.pdf.
108. See Brisman, supra note 81, at 445 (quoting Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 1, at
49).
109. See Elizabeth Curtin, Home Sweet Home for Ex-Offenders, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 51, at 115.
110. See Brisman, supra note 81, at 446-48.

111. See Curtin, supra note 109, at 115 (noting that "ex-offenders are frequently rejected
upon first application based on their criminal records").
112. Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
113. Pub. L. No. 105-276, tit. V, 112 Stat. 2518 (1998).
114. Section 8, or "the housing choice voucher program[,] is the federal government's major
program for assisting very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe,
and sanitary housing in the private market." U.S. Dep't of Housing, Housing Choice Vouchers
Fact Sheet http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/ fact-sheet.cfm (last updated Feb.
3, 2006). Through the program, landlords of privately owned rental units receive subsidies on
behalf of qualified low-income tenants, allowing tenants to pay lower rent. See id.
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registration requirement or has been convicted of methamphetamine production
on a public housing premises."15 If any member of the household was evicted
from public housing because of drug-related crimes, the household is barred
for three years, unless the ex-offender completes an approved rehabilitation program. 116 Significantly, federal law grants public housing agencies
broad discretion to deny housing to virtually anyone with a criminal record.
For example, local housing authorities may deny housing for a "reasonable
time" to individuals who have "engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal
activity or other criminal activity which would adversely affect the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents, the
owner, or public housing agency employees. . 117 With this discretion,
public housing authorities have implemented a variety of policies, ranging from
specific-automatically denying eligibility to those previously evicted from
public housing because of drug-related or violent activity-to broad-denying
18
eligibility for current or past criminal activity, regardless of when it occurred. l
115. 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2000) (registered sex offenders); 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204(a)(3)(4) (2005) (registered sex offenders and those convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine on
the premises of federally-assisted housing).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a) (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(1) (2005) (also specifying that a
rehabilitation program must be approved by the local housing provider).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2000). See also 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c) (2005) (providing that
in screening applicants, public housing authorities may consider "all relevant information").
118. See, e.g., LEGAL ACTION CTR., PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH

CRIMINAL RECORDS IN CALIFORNIA: SAN FRANCISCO 2-3 (2001), http://www.lac.org/modules/
ncjta/sf.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL ACTION CTR., CAL. POLICIES] (stating that the San Francisco

Housing Authority considers "any individual who has 'any previous or current drug-related
criminal activity or patterns of alcohol abuse' ineligible, but it has discretion to lift the bar to
eligibility based on evidence of rehabilitation) (citations omitted); LEGAL ACTION CTR., PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN DELAWARE:
SUSSEX & NEW CASTLE COUNTIES 2 (2001), http://www.lac.org/modules/ncjta/ sussex.pdf (stating

that the Sussex County Housing Authority bars "previous tenants evicted for drug-related criminal
activity... from applying for public housing for a specified time period") (citations omitted); id. at
5 (stating that it is the New Castle Housing Authority's policy to deny eligibility if "any member
of the family has ever been evicted from public housing" or if "any family member's drug or
alcohol abuse interferes with the health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment of other project residents");
LEGAL ACTION CTR., PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS

IN FLORIDA: BROWARD COUNTY 1 (2001), http://www.lac.org/modules/ncjta/broward.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL ACTION CTR., FLA. POLICIES] ("The [Broward County] Housing Authority has the

discretion to bar... [flamilies who have previously been evicted from public housing; [and
a]pplicants or family members who have been convicted of criminal activity, drug-related criminal
criminal activity .... "); LEGAL ACTION CTR., PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2001),
activity or violent

http://www.lac.org/modules/ncjta/lowell.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL ACTION CTR., MASS. POLICIES]

("In determining an applicant's eligibility for housing assistance, the [Lowell Housing Authority]
will consider any criminal history information, regardless of when the criminal activity occurred.")
(citations omitted); LEGAL ACTION CTR., PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS IN NEW YORK CITY 1-2 (2001), http://www.lac.org/modules/ncjta/nyc.pdf
[hereinafter LEGAL ACTION CTR., NEW YORK CITY POLICIES] ("[The New York City Housing

Authority] has the discretion to deny housing to applicants who have been convicted of any
criminal offense, including a violation. In general, people with criminal convictions must complete
their sentences (including probation and/or parole and the payment of any fines) and then may be
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Federal law requires local housing authorities to include provisions in leases
that permit housing authorities to terminate the leases of criminals,1 19 but it
allows local housing authorities to discern when to invoke the provision.
Unsurprisingly, public housing authorities across the country have enforced the

law in a variety of ways: Some evict tenants only when they have been convicted
of a drug offense. 120 Others may evict tenants when they are charged with a
drug crime, arrested, or are involved in allegedly criminal activity on or off the
premises. 12 1 The Supreme Court has dealt another blow, finding that these
federally-mandated lease provisions may be triggered regardless of whether a

tenant knew or had reason to know of the drug-related activity of a relative or
12 2
guest.
Although purportedly designed to provide a safer environment for public
housing residents, 12 3 these laws, decisions, and policies do not significantly
advance this goal. 12 4 Instead, they just exacerbate the challenges of reentry.
made ineligible for public housing for two to six years, depending on the severity of their crimes."
(emphasis in original)).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000) ("[All leases must] provide that any criminal activity
that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or
any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant,
any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control,
shall be cause for termination of tenancy ....").
120. See, e.g., Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1303 (4th Cir. 1992)
(describing the Forfeiture Project of the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
and the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), in which public housing authorities in more than twenty
cities were selected to participate, and through which the federal government encourages summary
eviction without notice or a hearing where a public housing tenant participated in at least two
felony drug offenses).
121. See, e.g., Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that termination proceedings were brought as a result of the arrest of a tenant on a narcotics
charge several miles from the housing project); LEGAL ACTION CTR., CAL. POLICIES, supra note
118, at 3-4 (stating that the San Francisco Housing Authority may terminate tenancy without a
grievance hearing based on criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right of peaceful
enjoyment of the premises or on drug-related activity either on or off premises); LEGAL ACTION
CTR., FLA. POLICIES, supra note 118, at 3 (stating that Broward County Housing Authority will
terminate a lease for any type of criminal activity, and that a conviction is not required where drugrelated activity provides the grounds for eviction); LEGAL ACTION CTR., MASS. POLICIES, supra
note 118, at 3-4 (stating that public housing tenants in Lowell are subject to eviction if any
household member or guest engages in "[c]riminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants," or" [d]rug-related criminal activity on or
off the premises," whether or not the person was arrested or prosecuted (citations omitted)).
122. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127-28 (2001) (affirming
that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) "requires lease terms that allow a local public housing authority to
evict a tenant when a member of the tenant's household or a guest engages in drug-related criminal
activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or had reason to know, of that activity").
123. See Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1990 § 5122, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11901(1) ("[T]he [flederal [g]overnment has a duty to provide public and other federally assisted
low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.").
124. For example, in Nashville, Tennessee, public housing applicants are barred if they have
a history of violent or drug-related offenses, and residents may be evicted ifguests or household
members are involved in criminal activity. Nonetheless, major crimes (including homicide, rape,
robbery, and assault) at public housing developments dropped by only 0.8 percent in 2001, even
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Indeed, an ex-offender's inability to access subsidized housing "significantly
diminishe[s]" her ability "to obtain and retain employment and [to] remain drugand crime-free. ..125 Furthermore, these policies punish, even fracture entire
families for the past behavior of one member of the household. Indeed, a
growing numbers of formerly incarcerated parents "find it nearly impossible to
reunify with their children without secure, stable housing."' 126 From a policy
standpoint, by permanently barring or imposing lengthy waiting periods on
individuals with criminal records, housing authorities further punish those who
have already paid their debt to society.
C. EducationalOpportunities
Education and vocational training are critical tools to help ex-offenders
gain employment, for many lack high school educations, job skills, and sizeable
work histories, 127 However, those with even minor drug convictions are
ineligible for federal educational aid under the Higher Education Amendments
of 1998.128

These amendments generally specify that students convicted of

federal or state drug-related offenses are ineligible for grants, loans, and work
assistance for varying periods of time depending on the nature of the offense and
the number of previous offenses. 129 For example: For one convicted of firsttime possession of a controlled substance, the ineligibility period is one year
from the date of conviction; 130 for one convicted of second-time possession, the
ineligibility period is two years, and, for one convicted of third-time possession,
the ineligibility period is "indefinite." 13 1 The ineligibility period for someone
convicted of first-time sale of a controlled substance is two years, and
though major offenses in all of Nashville dropped nine percent. Christian Bottorff& Sheila Burke,
Crime Hard To Uproot in Public Housing, TENNESSEAN, June 22, 2003, available at
http://tennessean.com/local/archives/03/06/34744648.shtml.
125. See Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 1, at 48.
126. Id.
127. See Kadela & Seiter, supra note 10, at 367; TRAviS, SOLOMON & WAUL, supra note 11,
at 31-32; Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilson, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on
Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 75-83 (2002). Empirical
research suggests that, among ex-offenders, vocational training reduces recidivism and improves
job readiness skills. Kadela & Seiter, supra note 10, at 373-74; TRAViS, SOLOMON & WAUL, supra
note 11, at 32-33.
128. Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C. (2000)).
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2000). The author of the amendments, Rep. Mark E. Souder of
Indiana, stated that the amendments were intended to: "1) deter students from using and selling
drugs on [their] college campuses; 2) help those who abuse drugs receive treatment; [and] 3) hold
students accountable for the taxpayer-provided financial aid they receive for their education."
Mark Souder, Editorial, Actions Have Consequences, USA TODAY, June 13, 2000, at 16A.
130. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(l).
131. Id. The Department of Education defines "indefinite" as "permanent, unless (1) the
student completes an approved drug rehabilitation program ... or (2) convictions are reversed, set
aside, or removed from the student's record ...." Student Assistance General Provisions, 64 Fed.
Reg. 57356, 57357 (Oct. 22, 1999) (amending 34 C.F.R. § 668.40).
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subsequent offenses result in indefinite ineligibility.
Various states link eligibility for need-based, state financial aid to the
qualifications imposed by the federal government under the Higher Education
Act. 133 Students convicted of a felony in Florida are ineligible for various
scholarships and grants. 134 Applicants for the South Carolina Need-Based Grant
program, designed to aid South Carolina's "neediest students," must verify that
they have never been convicted of any felonies or any alcohol or drug-related
misdemeanor offenses within the past academic year. 135 In Texas, students are
not eligible for the Texas Grant Program if they have been convicted of a felony
or a crime involving any controlled substance. 136 In Oklahoma, students
qualifying for the Oklahoma Higher Learning Access Program, providing aid to
to
students with annual family income of less than 50,000 dollars, must pledge 137
"refrain from substance abuse" and "refrain from criminal or delinquent acts."
In the 2000 to 2001 academic year, approximately 67,000 applicants for
federal student aid indicated they had been convicted of selling or possessing
drugs, and an additional 11,417 left the question blank. 138 Overall, more than
140,000 students have been denied federal aid since the prohibition was
enacted. 139 Thus, substantial numbers of students are denied the assistance
necessary to pursue a higher education and, in turn, the opportunity to increase
their employment options and earning potential.
D. Interplay of Factors
Patricia Allard details how the fate of ex-offenders crystallizes when all of
these sanctions converge:

132. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1).
133. See, e.g., 281 NEB. ADMIN. CODE ch. 6, § 006.01 (2004) ("In order to be eligible... [a]
student shall be eligible to receive a Federal Pell Grant..."); R.I. HIGHER EDUC. ASSISTANCE
AUTH., FINANCIAL AID HANDBOOK 5 (2005), http://www.riheaa.org/borrowers/ handbook0506.pdf
(eligible students must "meet Title IV eligibility requirements concerning drug convictions and

registering with Selective Service").
134. See Fla. Dep't of Educ., Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program, http://www.fim
.edu/ doe/brfutures/howapply.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
135. S.C. COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUC., SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS 1 (2005), available at

http://www.che.sc.gov/StudentServices/scholarship_brochure-2005.pdf.
136. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 22.228(c)(6) (2004). A student is ineligible for two years after
the completion of her sentence. Id.
137. OKLA. STATE REGENTS FOR HIGHER EDUC., OKLAHOMA HIGHER LEARNING ACCESS
PROGRAM ("OHLAP") APPLICATION 2 (2005), available at http://www.okhighered.org/ohlap/2005-

06-app.pdf. This "refrain from" language strongly suggests that any violation or conviction while
in the OHLAP could cause the student to be removed. While the language of the application does
not explicitly ban students with prior criminal records, it could also apply to them, as well.
138. Dan Curry, U.S. May Relax Ban on Aid for Those with Drug Convictions, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 7, 2001, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v48/i02/02a03402.htm.
139. Press Release, Coalition for Higher Educ. Act Reform, Drug Treatment, Rehabilitation
and Policy Reform Leaders Call for Repeal of Financial Aid Drug Penalty (May 12, 2004),
http://www.raiseyourvoice.com/PR-Natl-5-12-04.pdf.
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Please imagine that you are a young woman in your first year in college
who works as a nurse's aide part-time to help pay your tuition. You meet
a young man who is charming, caring, and who works in a factory in town.
You fall madly in love with him, get married, and give birth to your first
child...
During the second year of your marriage the factory in town closes and
relocates overseas. Your husband loses his job. He tries for months to
find another job but has no luck because the economy has gone sour. He
starts using and selling drugs... [O]ne night a drug squad awakens you,
and both you and your husband are arrested for possession of controlled substances... Ten grams of crack are found in your home.
The prosecutor tells you, "I'll cut you a deal if you give me some names."
But you can't give him any names because you're not involved in the drug
ring; you've never even used drugs. So, you're convicted and sentenced
under a mandatory minimum sentencing law to a sentence lengthier than
those received by the actual drug dealers your husband knew.
At the time of your conviction, you're expecting your second child. You
receive no prenatal care while in prison, and give birth shackled to the
hospital bed and surrounded by prison guards. During your prison term,
your mother cares for your daughter but is unable to care for the newborn.
So your brother and sister-in-law agree to care for your baby boy in
addition to their four children. But because your sister-in-law has a threeyear old drug conviction, she and your brother cannot be foster or adoptive
parents, and so your son becomes a ward of the state. After the baby
spends [fifteen] consecutive months in the child welfare system, your
parental rights to the baby are terminated, and the baby is placed on an
adoption list. You may never see your child again.
When you leave prison, you decide to move in with your mother and your
daughter, who live in Section 8 housing. But if you move in, they may be
evicted because of your drug conviction. So you go to a woman's shelter
and try to get your old job back as a nurse's aide. However, due to your
drug conviction you're barred from the field of nursing. You figure you'll
go back to college to get another degree. But because of your drug
conviction you're denied federal financial aid.
Your mother falls ill and can no longer care for your daughter. You decide
to apply for welfare benefits to provide for you and your daughter until
you get back on your feet, but once again, because of your conviction,
14
you're denied access to these benefits. 0
While each barrier is onerous standing alone, their cumulative effect
completely precludes many ex-offenders from ever making a living. For example, the ban on public assistance makes it difficult for an ex-offender to find
suitable housing. In turn, not being able to secure a stable place to live affects
her ability to secure employment. (After all, the application process calls for an

140. Allard, Claiming our Rights, supra note 64, at 223-24.

Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

N.YU. REVIEW OFLAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 30:527

address and telephone number.14 1 ) If she does gain employment, her job may
barely pay enough to cover rent (as is the case with most jobs available to those
financially-strapped and particularly to those who, perhaps due to a ban on
financial aid, lack training). And she is caught in a web: her job may never pay
enough to cover rent. Indeed, a lack of educational assistance not only cuts off
attempts to pursue higher education, but also diminishes access to higher-paying
employment opportunities which require specialized training.
III.
NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE STATE COURT LITIGATION STRATEGY

To dismantle this crippling web of collateral sanctions, advocates must
engage in a comprehensive, citizenship-freeing 142 litigation attack on reentry
barriers. While legal advocates who provide services to ex-offenders often use
litigation and other advocacy tools to help ensure that individual clients are able
to obtain the life necessities, 143 advocates often do not specifically bring
strategic impact litigation to directly challenge collateral sanctions. 144 To do so
141. Thompson, supra note 13, at 279.
142. See Demleitner, PreventingInternalExile supra note 4.
143. See Debbie A. Mukamal, Confronting the Employment Barriersof Criminal Records:
Effective Legal and PracticalStrategies, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 597, 604 (2000). Mukamel
proffers:
Legal advocates working with clients who have criminal histories can assist them in
mitigating employment barriers by making them aware of laws affecting them, helping
them clean up their criminal records and attain certificates of rehabilitation, and
advising them on the most effective ways to address their criminal backgrounds.
Advocates can also promote the employment of ex-offender clients by educating
employers about the benefits of and regulations governing the hiring of ex-offenders.
Id. Community Legal Services of Philadelphia provides an excellent model of a legal aid
organization that provides comprehensive services to clients. The organization offers civil legal
services to ex-offenders who are denied employment, public benefits, public housing, and Section
8 assistance. See Cmty. Legal Servs. of Phila., Information for Ex-offenders, http://www.clsphila
.org/Ex-OffendersInformation.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). Public defender offices also play
an important role in assisting ex-offenders to navigate reentry barriers. For example, the Clark
County Public Defender office in Las Vegas, Nevada, works with residents of the Buena Vista
housing project to secure record expungement and to register voters. See Timothy Pratt, Voting
Rights 'Blessing' for Ex-felons, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 18, 2004, http://www.lasvegassun.com/
sunbin/stories/sun/2004/j un/18/517041245.html.
144. Thus far, systemic litigation has focused on voting rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bush,
353 F.3d 1287 (1 1th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc, 377 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir. 2004) (challenging
disenfranchisement of ex-felons in Florida); Hayden v. Pataki, No. 0OCiv.8586, 2004 WL 1335921
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (challenging New York law barring incarcerated or paroled felons from
voting). There has also been sporadic litigation challenging other reentry barriers. See, e.g., Turner
v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2000) (challenging the TANF ban); Nixon v. Commonwealth,
839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003) (challenging a Pennsylvania law barring employment of persons
convicted of various offenses in facilities providing care to the elderly). Cases challenging
economic and social barriers have for the most part been brought under federal law, with very
limited success, and there has not been a critical mass of cases or sufficient focus on the full range
of reentry barriers. See, e.g., Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002)
(upholding evictions from public housing); Bolden v. City of New York, 256 F. Supp. 2d 193, 194
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding termination of public employment due to felony conviction); Delong
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would be a bigger step in restoring the rights of individuals who must live with
these barriers, for collateral sanctions will continue to ensnare individuals and
their communities unless resources are directed toward actually changing these
policies wholesale. 14 5 And to change these policies, the most effective form of
attack is state-by-state impact litigation, particularly in vulnerable states: those
with extensive, challenge-worthy mazes of collateral sanctions and constitutional and statutory provisions. Why state courts? Although some specialized
challenges may be available under federal law, as discussed below, litigation relying on federal constitutional or statutory protections may not provide widespread relief to ex-offenders. Moreover, in the context of collateral
sanctions, state court litigation may be more effective because states and
municipalities are the arbiter of reentry policy; they have either been given
latitude and discretion in setting qualifications for federal programs, or they have
imposed the restrictions themselves. 14 6 Thus, local authorities determine how
restrictive their policies will be.
It is clear that any litigation strategy will be unsuccessful standing alone.
State-court litigation must be accompanied by supportive legislative and public
education efforts. Through a coordinated three-prong approach, advocates can
counter the negative public opinion and lack of political will that often defeat
attacks on these civil penalties. 147 After all, litigation may act as an impetus for
v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (same); Turner, 207
F.3d at 423 (upholding TANF ban); Schanuel v. Anderson, 546 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D. Il. 1982),
aff'd, 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding statute prohibiting employment of convicted felons
as armed guards or investigators).
145. See Neal Pierce, Bush's "Prisoner Re-entry" Proposal-Mighty Modest but a Start,
WASH. POST WRITERS GROUP,

http://www.postwritersgroup.com/archives/peir0126.htm,

(last

visited Mar. 23, 2006) (observing that if the President were truly concerned about providing exoffenders a second chance, he would support a repeal of both the harsh mandatory minimum
sentencing laws that precipitated the unprecedented rate of incarceration and the numerous federal
provisions that prevent ex-offenders from obtaining welfare benefits, affordable housing, or tuition
assistance).
146. For example, the federal government rewards local public housing agencies that adopt
policies and procedures to evict individuals who engage in "certain activity detrimental to the
public housing community." 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(vii) (2001). Public housing officials have
interpreted this mandate to include individuals who may pose no current danger, but who happen
to have criminal histories. See, e.g., LEGAL ACTION CTR., MASS. POLICIES, supra note 118, at 1-2
("In determining an applicant's eligibility for housing assistance, the [Lowell Housing Authority]
will consider any criminal history information, regardless of when the criminal activity occurred
.... All applicants who have engaged in any criminal activity are initially denied housing.")
(emphasis in original); Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 1, at 45-47 (describing how local
housing authorities have implemented the federal government's "mandate to get tough on drugs
and crime in public housing"). Similarly, Congress allows states to refuse to revoke a driver's
license of an individual convicted of a drug offense but keep federal highway funds by submitting
certification that the governor and state legislature oppose revocation. 23 U.S.C. § 159(a)(3)(B)
(2000). Nonetheless, many states have instead chosen to automatically revoke an individual's
driver's license. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
147. See Felix Lopez, Lawyers Matter, Policy Matters: How One Small Not-for-Profit
Combats DiscriminationAgainst Ex-Offenders, People in Recovery, and People with AIDS, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 443, 445 (1998) (discussing the "political warfare" necessary to enact
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change in the legislative and public opinion arenas. For-even if unsuccessfulcomprehensive litigation challenge will bring to light a problem that is otherwise
invisible to the general public and, hence, to policymakers: the many layers of
14 8
civil disabilities imposed on ex-offenders.
A. The Ineffectiveness of Federal Causes ofAction
1. ConstitutionalChallenges
As a class, people with criminal records have been afforded very little
protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause offers little
hope for relief. 14 9 The most stringent test under the Equal Protection Clause is
"strict scrutiny," under which the governmental entity must prove that a
classification serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored
to promote that interest. 150 A governmental action triggers strict scrutiny when
it burdens a fundamental right or makes a classification on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin. 15 1 Convicted felons are not a suspect class for
equal protection purposes under the federal constitution. 152 Furthermore, the
public policy changes for ex-offenders, who "occupy such a low rung on the American social
ladder").
148. See Demleitner, Preventing InternalExile, supra note 4, at 154 ("The number and scope
of such adverse consequences tend to be unknown even to the participants in the criminal justice
system, often because they are scattered throughout different bodies of law.")
149. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Under the
three-tiered approach applied to equal protection cases developed by the Supreme Court,
government classifications that burden a "suspect class" or infringe upon a "fundamental right"
will be sustained only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (stating that classifications subject to strict
scrutiny "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
government interests"); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("Classifications based on race or
national origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting
scrutiny."). An intermediate level of scrutiny applies to classifications on the basis of gender and
illegitimacy. Id. This level of scrutiny requires that the classification serve "important
governmental objectives" and be "substantially related" to the achievement of those objectives.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996). A classification subject to the lowest level
of scrutiny will be upheld if there is a "rational" relationship between the classification and the
subject matter of the legislation. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996). The highly
deferential rational basis test treats legislative classifications as presumptively valid. See id. at 632
("In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government
interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the
rationale for it seems tenuous.").
150. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
291 (1978) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination.").
151. Clark,486 U.S. at461.
152. Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 F. App'x 199, 203 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion)
("It is well-settled ... that prisoners do not constitute a suspect class"); Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d
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Supreme Court has not found
economic rights, such as welfare and employment,
1 53
to be fundamental rights.
Together, the Supreme Court and Congress have significantly limited
federal sources of economic rights, making it all the more necessary that
advocates rely on state-law-based rights to protect poor ex-offenders. "From the
founding, the states were charged with providing for the poor, a state duty
derived from English law and tradition. Although the class of eligible needy
slowly expanded ... this expansion of beneficiaries never blossomed into a corre
-sponding citizen right to state assistance."' 154 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme
Court recognized that welfare benefits-rather than being "mere charity" or
"privilege"-"are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to
receive them." 155 However, the Court did not explicitly find that poverty was a
suspect classification, nor did it find that receipt of welfare benefits was a fundamental property right worthy of heightened scrutiny. 156 In subsequent cases, the
Court has rejected the notion that the federal constitution imposes an affirmative
obligation upon the government to provide a minimum level of subsistence, and
it has afforded social welfare legislation the utmost deference. 15 7 Similarly,
the Court has held that employment is not a fundamental right, 158 and that
814, 820-22 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d
Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny to a felon disenfranchisement law because "in the
absence of any allegation that a challenged classification was intended to discriminate on the basis
of race or other suspect criteria, statutes that deny felons the right to vote are not subject to strict
judicial scrutiny"). Although no court has accepted the theory, one commentator has argued that
classifications based on criminal conviction should be treated as suspect, much like classifications
on the basis of race and national origin, because of the history of purposeful unequal treatment of
ex-offenders, the civil disabilities that they face, and their political powerlessness. Kay Kohler, The
Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination Against Ex-prisoners, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1403, 1420-21 (1975).
153. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984) ("[T]here
is no fundamental right to government employment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.");
Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) (noting that there is no fundamental right to receive
welfare); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-37 (1973) (finding no
fundamental right to education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (finding no
fundamental right to "decent, safe, and sanitary housing"); Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045, 1047
(11 th Cir. 2003) (finding that "'employment rights are state-created rights and are not fundamental
rights created by the Constitution' (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir.
1994)); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no fundamental right to
visit family members who live in public housing); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding no fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle); Wells v. Malloy, 402 F. Supp. 856,
858 (D. Vt. 1975) (same), aft'd, 538 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1976).
154. William C. Rava, State ConstitutionalProtectionsfor the Poor, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 543,
548 (1998).
155. 397 U.S. 254, 262, 265 (1970).
156. See id. at 260-66 (finding that termination of welfare benefits without an evidentiary
hearing violated Fourteenth Amendment due process rights).
157. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970) (applying rational basis
scrutiny in a challenge to Maryland's public assistance program).
158. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (finding no fundamental right
to government employment and noting that "a standard less than strict scrutiny has consistently
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159
economic regulations are presumptively constitutional.
Just as the federal courts have been withdrawing from their role as

protectors of the poor, Congress has also been doing so by making clear that
there is no entitlement to federal welfare and by shifting responsibility for

welfare implementation to the states. 160 This trend makes independent state
constitutional analysis particularly appropriate-and necessary. In some instances, state law remedies may be the only hope of indigent ex-offenders

seeking food, housing, and other financial assistance. 161
Under the federal constitution, a facially neutral law is also subject to strict

scrutiny if it is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. 162 In order to trigger
strict scrutiny, however, plaintiffs must do more than show that the laws have a
disproportionate impact on a protected class, such as African Americans;
disparate impact alone is insufficient to support a finding of invidious racial
discrimination. 163 Federal courts have rejected the argument that statistical

evidence that a statute has a disproportionate impact on a particular class of
people is sufficient to prove intentional discrimination.164 Instead, the disparate
impact must be traceable to a discriminatory purpose. 165 This well-established
line of cases would likely foreclose strict scrutiny review for challenges to
reentry barriers. 166 Despite the significant disproportionate racial impact of
been applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities")
(internal citation omitted).
159. Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1982) [hereinafter State Constitutional Rights] (arguing that since 1937,
with the demise of the Lochner era, "federal courts have abandoned serious review of
economic regulations").
160. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 401,
42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (stating that TANF block grants are intended to increase the flexibility of
the states in operating welfare programs, and that there is no individual entitlement to assistance
under any state program funded by TANF).
161. See Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577,
595-605 (1989) (arguing that, in contrast to the federal constitution, specific provisions in state
constitutions may guarantee state protection for indigent children); Burt Neuborne,
Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of PositiveRights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 896-901
(1989) (arguing that state courts are institutionally better suited than federal courts to protect
welfare rights); Risa E. Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare Queen": Using State
Constitutions To Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 301,
321-26 (1997) (arguing that because federal statutory and constitutional challenges offer
limited relief, state constitutions provide a useful and necessary alternative litigation strategy for
protecting the rights of welfare recipients).
162. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
163. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 97-99 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding no racial
animus even though "[t]he statistical evidence regarding discriminatory impact is ...irresistible:
approximately [eighty-eight percent] of defendants charged with crack/cocaine-related crimes are
[African American]").

165. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
166. In one case in which plaintiffs sought strict scrutiny review of a reentry barrier, the court
never addressed whether a showing of intent was necessary, but found that strict scrutiny was not
triggered because there was no showing of disparate impact. In Lewis v. Alabama Dep't of Public
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many of these collateral sanctions, it would be difficult to establish sufficient
racially-discriminatory intent to sustain an equal protection challenge based on
race; there is little to no evidence that these collateral sanctions were enacted
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of [their] adverse effects upon an identifiable
' 16 7

group."

Absent a finding of suspect classification or fundamental right, federal
courts would apply the "rational basis" test to collateral sanctions. The rational
basis test, the most lenient type of review under the Equal Protection Clause,
upholds governmental classifications that bear a "rational relation to some
legitimate end." 168 When applying the rational basis test to the suspension or
termination of the rights of convicted persons, federal courts have interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause so as to make it easy for governmental entities to meet
their burden.

169

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also offers little
hope for substantive relief from collateral sanctions. The Due Process Clause
170
includes both a substantive component and a procedural component.
Safety, 831 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Ala. 1993), the plaintiff challenged a regulation barring
individuals with felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions involving violence or moral
turpitude from being placed on the list of wrecker operators to be called by state troopers. Id. at
825. The plaintiff introduced statistical evidence of the percentage of African American
misdemeanor convictions compared with White misdemeanor convictions in Lee County,
Alabama, but admitted that "out of a total of 2,055 misdemeanor convictions in Lee County, the
racial makeup of the offenders was unknown in 1,366 of the cases." Id. The court declined to
apply strict scrutiny, finding that the plaintiff's evidence could not support "a claim that this
regulation discriminates against [African Americans]." Id. The court nonetheless found a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause under the rational basis test. Id. at 827.
167. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Similar equal protection challenges were mounted, without
success, to address the vast disparity between sentences for crack/cocaine and powder cocaine
under the federal sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Teague, 93 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir.
1996), (holding that there is no evidence that Congress reaffirmed the sentencing disparity in 1995
because of its adverse impact on African Americans); United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 96-99
(2d Cir. 1995) (finding that Congress did not enact the sentencing disparity with a discriminatory
intent); United States v. Dumas, 64 F.3d 1427, 1430-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no evidence of
racial animus and stating that the hasty manner in which Congress adopted the distinction between
sentencing for crack and powder cocaine is not evidence of intentional racial discrimination).
168. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
169. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 F. App'x 199, 203 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished
decision) (upholding disenfranchisement of convicted felons under rational basis test); United
States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding statute barring convicted felons
from jury service because "[tihe government has a legitimate interest in protecting the probity of
juries"); Davis v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 799, 800 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding denial of right of Social
Security benefits to convicted felon under rational basis test); Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d
1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding denial of dance hall operation license to convicted felon
because the city "could [have] rationally conclude that denying a license to felons would [have]
further[ed] the city's legitimate purpose of insuring that dance halls are operated by persons of
integrity with respect for the law").
170. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
("The claim is one invoking the substantive rather than the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause; petitioners do not claim that the State denied [plaintiff] protection without
according him appropriate procedural safeguards, but that it was categorically obligated to protect
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Substantive due process "forbids the government to infringe certain fundamental
liberty interests ...no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 17 1 Where the claimed
right is not fundamental, state action need only be "rationally connected" to a
legitimate state objective in order to survive a substantive due process challenge. 172 Federal substantive due process challenges to collateral consequences
have been unsuccessful because courts have found either that there was no
73
liberty interest at stake or that the regulation met the rational basis test. 1
One federal court of appeals has considered whether the ban on TANF assistance violates substantive due process. 174 In Turner v. Glickman, the plaintiffs
brought substantive due process and equal protection claims; the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied rational basis scrutiny on both claims
because the statute did not implicate any fundamental rights or make any suspect classifications. 17 5 The court found that "rendering those convicted of drugrelated felony crimes ineligible to receive food stamps or aid under TANF is a
potentially serious sanction," and was therefore a rational means to deter drug
use. 176 The court also noted that, based on testimony in the legislative record
that food stamps were being traded for drugs, Congress could rationally have
determined that the ban would reduce fraud. 177 Legal advocates seeking to
challenge the TANF ban would have a difficult time convincing any federal
court applying a similarly deferential review that the ban does not further a valid
state interest.
The procedural component of the Due Process Clause focuses on the means
by which the interest at issue is deprived. 178 To determine whether governhim in these circumstances." (citations omitted)).
171. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

172. Id. at 303.
173. See, e.g., Delong v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (finding that statute requiring dismissal of federal employees with prior convictions from

positions involving regular contact with Indian children is rationally related to government's
interest in "protecting [Indian] children from abuse"); Bolden v. City of New York, 256 F. Supp.
2d 193, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding statute requiring automatic dismissal of city employees
upon conviction of a felony, because civil servant convicted of a felony while in office loses all
property interest in the position); Schanuel v. Anderson, 546 F. Supp. 519, 523 (S.D. Ill. 1982)
(upholding statute prohibiting employment of felons as armed guards or investigators because the
government could "conclude rationally that someone who has chosen to violate the laws of the

federal or state government within the previous ten years has demonstrated himself unfit for a
potentially sensitive position .... ").
174. Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2000).

175. Id. at 424-27.
176. Id. at 425.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) ("[D]ue process requires that when a
State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest.., it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." (quoting Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950))); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971) (Due Process Clause provides that an individual must have a meaningful
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mental action complies with the constitutional requirement of procedural due
process, the court must determine whether there is a liberty or property interest at
stake, and, if a protected interest is found, determine the nature of the process
due to the plaintiff. 179 Thus, even if a court found that ex-offenders possess a
property interest 180 in the economic and social service benefits and opportunities
being denied through collateral sanctions, the only remedy available would be
implementation
of sufficient process before ex-offenders may be denied
18 1
benefits.
2. DisparateImpact and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In response to the shortcomings of the Equal Protection Clause in
addressing disparate impact, civil rights advocates have traditionally looked to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in
federally funded programs. 182 However, a series of recent Supreme Court cases
has narrowed this avenue of redress. While not completely foreclosed,
challenges under regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI and Section 1983
have questionable chances of success. Although such challenges could be used
to supplement state law claims in some jurisdictions, advocates cannot rely upon
them as the centerpiece of any litigation strategy.
Sections 601 and 602 of Title VI provide two potential avenues for
enforcement. Section 601 of Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 18 3 The
Supreme Court interpreted Section 601 as enabling citizens to file private

opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive her of any significant property interest).
179. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1987).
180. This question further complicates claims under the Due Process Clause. Due process
protections apply only to benefits to which individuals have a "legitimate claim of entitlement"
under the applicable statute. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Thus, the Supreme Court has found that "a person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and
administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those
benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process." Id (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970)). In the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, however,
Congress stated that the TANF statute should not be interpreted to entitle any person to welfare
assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000). This express disclaimer reopens the question of whether
procedural due process protects a TANF recipient's interest in receiving benefits. Notwithstanding
the Congressional amendment, however, lower courts have subsequently continued to apply
procedural due process protections in welfare benefit termination cases. See, e.g., Kapps v. Wing,
404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2005); Lawson el rel. Lawson v. Dept of Health and Social Services,
2004 WL 440405, at *3-4 (Del. Sup. 2004); Vance v. Housing Opp. Comm'n of Montgomery
County, 332 F. Supp. 2d 832 (D. Md. 2.004).
18 1. This result would certainly benefit ex-offenders, but would not provide the widespread,
substantive relief advocated in this article.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-d7 (2000).
183. Id. § 2000d.
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lawsuits challenging the discriminatory actions of any recipient of federal
funds. 184 However, the Court required citizen plaintiffs to prove that recipients
185
of the funds engaged in intentional discrimination.
Section 602 of Title VI states that federal agencies shall issue regulations
that specify how agencies should deal with recipients of federal funds who
implement policies resulting in disparate impact. 18 6 In GuardiansAssociation v.
Civil Service Commission, Justice White strongly suggested that Title VI
prohibits practices that have a disparate racial impact. 187 In addition, lower
courts consistently found that Title VI granted a private right of action to enforce
regulations promulgated under Section 602,188 making Title VI a powerful
184. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) ("We have no doubt that
Congress... understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of
the prohibited discrimination.").
185. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) ("In view of the
clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.").
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) ("Each [f]ederal department and agency which is
empowered to extend [f]ederal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant,
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of [S]ection 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with
which the action is taken."). A significant number of regulations prohibiting disparate impact in
federally funded programs have been promulgated under Section 602. See Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 592 n.13 ("[S]hortly after these initial regulations
were promulgated, every Cabinet department and about [forty] federal agencies adopted Title VI
regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination."). See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (2005)
(Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.13(c)-(d) (2005) (Department of Energy); 15
C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2) (2005) (Department of Commerce); 22 C.F.R. § 141.3(b)(2) (2005) (Department
of State); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.4(2)(i), (3) (2005) (Department of Housing and Urban Development); 28
C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)-(3) (2005) (Department of Justice); 29 C.F.R. §§ 31.3(b)(2)-(3) (2005)
(Department of Labor); 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(b)(2) (2004) (Department of Defense); 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.3(b)(2) (2005) (Department of Education); 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.3(b)(2)-(3) (2005) (Department
of the Interior); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3(b)(2)-(3) (2005) (Department of Health and Human Services);
49 C.F.R. §§ 21.5(b)(2)-(3) (2005) (Department of Transportation).
187. GuardiansAss 'n, 463 U.S. at 589 ("The Court squarely held in Lau v. Nichols that Title
VI forbids the use of federal funds not only in programs that intentionally discriminate on racial
grounds but also in those endeavors that have a disparate impact on racial minorities.") (citation
omitted). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (finding a violation of Section 601
where a school district's refusal to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese
ancestry made many students' classroom experiences "wholly incomprehensible and in no way
meaningful.").
188. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 294 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[E]very Court of Appeals to address the question has concluded that a private right of action
exists to enforce the rights guaranteed both by the text of Title VI and by any regulations validly
promulgated pursuant to that Title..."); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 1999)
(rejecting defendants' argument that Title VI regulations do not provide a private right of action);
New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that
private plaintiff may sue to enforce regulations promulgated by the Department of Transportation);
Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20
(1st Cir. 1986) (noting that private plaintiffs must establish discriminatory impact in order to
prevail in a suit to enforce Title VI regulations).
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189
weapon to attack systemic discrimination.
Alexander v. Sandoval put an end to all of that. 190 In Sandoval, the
Supreme Court found that there was no private cause of action to enforce
regulations enacted pursuant to Section 602.191 According to the Court, only
Section 601 creates a private right of action, and furthermore, Section 601
prohibits only intentional discrimination. 192 Federal agencies may use Section 602 to further enforce rights conferred in Section 601, but regulations prom1 93
ulgated under Section 602 cannot create an additional private right of action.
In Sandoval, some members of the Court appeared to invite actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce regulations promulgated under Section 602,194
195
although lower courts differed on whether such suits could in fact be brought.
Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law,
deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
197
Constitution and laws," 19 6 including rights conferred by federal statute.
Accordingly, Section 1983 provides a private right of action whenever an
individual has been deprived of any constitutional or statutory federal right
under color of state law. 19 8 Moreover, several courts have interpreted federal regulations to create rights enforceable under Section 1983,199 including

189. See, e.g., Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
district court erred in requiring plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent in a case challenging school
construction and expansion under Title VI and accompanying regulations); Larry P. ex rel. Lucille
P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendants violated regulations promulgated
under Title VI by using I.Q. tests to place students in classes for the educable mentally retarded
where those tests had a racially discriminatory impact); Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol,
89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss complaint in
which plaintiffs alleged that highway drug interdiction practices had a discriminatory impact on
motorists of color in violation of Title VI regulations); Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches
v. Md. Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999) (finding private of action available
to challenge racial profiling of motorists under Title VI regulations).
190. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
191. Id. at 293.
192. Id. at 280.
193. Id. at 291-92.
194. Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)
("Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all
likelihood must only reference [Section] 1983 to obtain relief ...").
195. Compare Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir 2002) ("Disparate impact
claims may still be brought against state officials for prospective injunctive relief through an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce [S]ection 602 regulations"), with S. Camden Citizens in Action
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Congress did not intend by
adoption of Title VI to create a federal right to be free from disparate impact discrimination,
and.., while the [agency's] regulations on that point may be valid, they nevertheless do not create
rights enforceable under [S]ection 1983.").
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
197. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
198. See id. at 4 (finding that "the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal
statutory as well as constitutional law").
199. See, e.g., Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
regulations promulgated under the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act create enforceable
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20 0
regulations promulgated under Title VI.

This too was a short-lived remedy. The Supreme Court effectively ended
the use of Section 1983 to enforce Title VI regulations with its decision in
Gonzaga University v. Doe.20 1 In Gonzaga, the plaintiff sued a private university to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 ("FERPA").2 °2 The Court rejected plaintiffs claim, concluding that
Congress had not intended to create a new federal right when it enacted
FERPA.2 °3 In reaching its conclusion, the Gonzaga Court asserted that some
courts had misunderstood its previous decision in Blessing v. Freestone20 4 to
permit enforcement of statutes through private suits under Section 1983
whenever "the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest that the statute is
intended to protect . ,205 The Court flatly rejected this interpretation, stating,
"We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under
[Section] 1983. " 2o6 Gonzaga, therefore, settled the question of whether the test
to determine availability of a private cause of action under Section 1983 was
distinct from the test to determine whether implied rights of action were
available under other statutes. 20

7

The Gonzaga Court found that "implied right

of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights

rights under § 1983); Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that plaintiffs are entitled to bring § 1983 action to enforce FCC regulations); W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that "valid federal regulations as well as
federal statutes may create rights enforceable under [S]ection 1983").
200. See, e.g., Powell, 189 F.3d at 401-03 (holding that Title VI regulations prohibiting
disparate impact may be enforced under § 1983).
201. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
202. Id. at 276.
203. Id. at 287-91. See also id. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The
ultimate question, in respect to whether private individuals may bring a lawsuit to enforce a federal
statute, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or otherwise, is a question of congressional intent."). Gonzaga
altered the test to determine the existence of rights enforceable under § 1983 established by the
Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). In Blessing, the Supreme Court
noted that it:
traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a particular statutory
provision gives rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the
provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the right allegedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the States.
Id. at 340-41 (citations omitted).

204. 420 U.S. 329 (1997).
205. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. See also id. ("Fueling this uncertainty is the notion that our
implied private right of action cases have no bearing on the standards for discerning whether a
statute creates rights enforceable by § 1983.... [W]e further reject the notion that our cases
permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action under
§ 1983.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 279-82.
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enforceable under [Section] 1983. '' 208
When Gonzaga is read with Sandoval, it appears that the current Supreme
Court would not allow a Section 1983 action to enforce Title VI disparate impact
regulations. Gonzaga requires clear congressional intent to create an individual
right in order for a private suit to be brought under Section 1983; the Court in
209
Sandoval found such congressional intent lacking in Section 602 of Title VI.
Interpretation of Gonzaga has created widespread disagreement among the
lower federal courts. Some lower courts have interpreted Gonzaga as effectively
eliminating enforcement of statutory rights under Section 1983 by requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the underlying statute contains an implied private
right of action. 2 10 Other courts have found that Gonzaga did not substantially
change the test to determine whether a private right of action is available under
Section 1983.211 Although Gonzaga's treatment by lower courts does not
signify a foregone conclusion that Section 1983 is unavailable, the divergent
2 12
analyses adopted by the courts make its future far from certain.
208. Id. at 283.
209. Compare id. at 282-86, with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
In Sandoval, the Court made an explicit distinction between Sections 601 and 602 of Title VI,
finding a private right of action exists under Section 601, Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285, but not under
Section 602, Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
210. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00-CV-7524, 2002 WL 31730963, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002) (declining to apply Blessing test because "after Gonzaga... the key
inquiry is whether Congress unambiguously created a private cause of action"); Briand v. Lavigne,
223 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244-45 (D. Me. 2002) (finding that Gonzaga requires a determination
whether statutory provisions are "right creating"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801
N.E.2d 326, 329 nI (N.Y. 2003) (stating that "where a statute does not clearly and unambiguously
create an implied private right of action, it also does not create rights enforceable under
42 U.S.C. [Section] 1983").
211. See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that
Gonzaga did not abandon the Blessing test but rather "clarified and emphasized that it is only
violations of rights, not laws, which give rise to [Section] 1983 actions") (citations omitted);
Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying the Blessing test); Kapps v.
Wing, 283 F. Supp. 2d 866, 879-81 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (acknowledging Gonzaga, but applying
Blessing test), vacated, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating district court's reliance on Blessing
because relief was available on an alternative legal theory, and it was thus not necessary to decide
how to interpret Section 1983 after Gonzaga); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 266 F. Supp. 2d 332, 341
(D. Conn. 2003) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 362 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Arrington v. Fuller,
237 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311-15 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (same). See also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 302
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that if the majority opinion is taken at its word "there should be no
difference between the Court's 'new' approach to discerning a federal right in the [Section] 1983
context and the test we have 'traditionally' used, as articulated in Blessing .... ").
212. Though remedies under Title VI may be unavailable, other federal remedies to the
disproportionate impact of collateral sanctions on racial minorities need not be foreclosed.
"Ex-offenders are blocked from employment not only by formal statutes and ordinances, but by
private employers. One study done in five major cities showed that two-thirds of employers would
not knowingly hire ex-offenders and at least one-third checked for criminal histories to weed exoffenders out." Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of Exconvicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 193, 196 (2004). Coupled with the disparate rate of incarceration of
African Americans and other racial minorities, such policies have a disproportionate impact. The
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has found that "due to this adverse impact, an
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B. Limitations on CurrentNonlitigation Strategies

Given the limited chance of success under federal law, advocates have
rightly focused their limited resources on legislative and policy reform and on
helping individual clients navigate the complex maze of reentry barriers. Advocates have actively pursued legislative and policy change at the federal, state,
and local level to eradicate collateral sanctions. There has been some momentum at the federal level with the introduction in Congress of the Second Chance
Act of 2004: Community Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, 2 13 but advocates are unsure of the legislation's chance of success. Also, the current legislation does not completely repeal the federal limitations placed on education and
welfare assistance. 2 14 Thus, while the bill's passage would be a significant victory, it would leave in place many of the obstacles ex-offenders currently face.
At the state level, there have also been some legislative successes. For
example, Pennsylvania recently repealed its welfare ban, 2 15 and Delaware
passed a bill lifting the ban on licensing for convicted felons in over thirty-five

employer may not base an employment decision on the conviction record of an applicant or
an employee absent business necessity."
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Notice
N-91 5.061 (Sept. 7, 1990), available at http://www.hirecheck.com/downloads/pdf/Compliance
Assistance/EEOCNOFRAME.pdf. Accordingly, advocates should consider filing disparate impact
litigation under Title VII challenging discriminatory employment practices.
213. The Second Chance Act of 2004 was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representatives Rob Portman (R-OH), with bipartisan support of three other Republicans and two
Democrats, on June 23, 2004. H.R. 4676, 108th Cong. (2004). A related bill has also been
introduced in the Senate, again with bipartisan support. See The Second Chance Act of 2004,
S.2789, 108th Cong. (2004) (introduced by Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS)); S.2923, 108th Cong.
(2004) (introduced by Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE)). In addition, several institutional projects
have been launched at the national level to address reentry issues. For example:
The Council of State Governments has established a Reentry Policy Council to develop
model programs and legislation to make prisoner reentry more successful.
The
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section has created a Task Force on
Collateral Sanctions to propose a new framework for assessing the growing maze of
legal barriers to the reintegration of ex-offenders.
Travis, Robinson & Solomon, supra note 5, at 13.
214. The Second Chance Act would establish a National Adult and Juvenile Offender
Reentry Resource Center for states, local governments, service providers, and other organizations
to collect and disseminate best practices and provide training and support around reentry. H.R.
4676 § 3(m). It would also create a federal task force to review and issue a report on federal
barriers to reentry and provide grants to community-based organizations "for the purpose of
providing mentoring and other transitional services essential to re-integrating ex-offenders." Id.
§§ 4, 16. While these reforms represent an important first step in addressing the myriad barriers
facing those returning home from prison, they do not repeal the existing barriers. For example, the
bill upholds the ban on federal student loans, but limits its applicability to those convicted while
receiving federal aid, in contrast to the current statute which denies aid to those with past as well as
present drug convictions. Id. § 15. The bill does not address federal restrictions on welfare and
public housing. In addition, most employment restrictions are creatures of state law, and thus the
bill does nothing to eliminate those.
215. See Pa. Dep't of Public Welfare, Were You Turned Down for Cash Assistance or Food
Stamps?, http://www.clsphila.org/PDFfolder/Notice lifting-ban on-DPWbenefits.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
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professions. 2 16 Because so many barriers are products of state law or of the
discretionary application of federal policy by state agencies, state-level
initiatives are an important strategy for reform. They are, however, subject to
the whims of political will, and it could take many years to achieve meaningful
reform.
There are an increasing number of programs aimed at assisting ex-offenders
to navigate the maze of collateral sanctions and to meet their daily needs at the
federal- and state-levels. For example, in the 2004 State of the Union address
President George W. Bush unveiled a proposal to spend 300 million dollars on
reentry initiatives over the next few years to help ex-offenders obtain housing,
employment, and mentoring. 2 17 The federal initiative will fund direct services
programs that-in addition to housing, employment, and counseling-help exoffenders with a full range of services including health care and reunification
with children. 2 18 These programs provide an invaluable service to ex-offenders
216. See Annie Turner, Delaware Law Lifts Employment Barrier for Ex-Cons, JOIN
TOGETHER, Aug. 13, 2004, http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/features/2004/delawarelaw-lifts-employment.html ("The legislation, sponsored by State Senator Karen Peterson (D) says
that licenses may only be refused if the applicant has been convicted of crimes that are
'substantially related' to the licensed profession or occupation.")
217. Bush, supra note *. President Bush announced:
This year, some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison back into society. We
know from long experience that if they can't find work, or a home, or help, they are
much more likely to commit crime and return to prison. So tonight, I propose a fouryear, [1300 million dollar prisoner re-entry initiative to expand job training and
placement services, to provide transitional housing, and to help newly released
prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based groups ... America is the land of
second chance [sic]-and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead
to a better life.
Id. The program-implemented through the Department of Labor ("DOL"), the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Justice-would help ex-offenders "find
and keep employment, obtain transitional housing and, receive mentoring." U.S. Dep't of Labor,
President Bush's Prisoner Re-entry Initiative: Protecting Communities by Helping Returning
Inmates Find Work, http://www.dol.gov/cfbci/reentryfactsheet.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006)
[hereinafter President Bush's Initiative]. It would expand on elements of the Ready4Work Project,
a pilot project at the DOL providing funding to successful direct services programs. See U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Ready4Work: A Business, Faith, Community & Criminal Justice Partnership,
http://www.dol.gov/cfbci/Ready4Work.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
218. Two participants in the Federal Ready4Work project provide good examples of the
kinds of direct services provided to ex-offenders by community-based organizations. Exodus
Transitional Community, Inc., established in 1999 in East Harlem, is staffed by ex-offenders and
individual directly affected by incarceration and/or HIV/AIDS. Union Square Awards, Julio
Medina, http://www.fcny.org/scripts/usq/getpageO2.pl?orgid=O Ill (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
Exodus' services include counseling, employment preparation, job, housing, health and
education referrals, court and parole assistance, and computer training. Exodus also
provides HIV/AIDS education and referrals for the person released from prison and his
or her partners, spouses, friends and families. Other activities include an after school
group with neighborhood youth and gang members and a speakers' bureau of formerly
incarcerated persons who make presentations to raise public awareness about prison
conditions and the impact of incarceration on individuals and communities.
Id. The City of Memphis Second Chance Program, established by Mayor Willie E. Herrington,
offers similar services. President Bush's Initiative, supra note 217. Legal advocates who
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and mitigate the impact of certain collateral sanctions. Nonetheless, they do not
eliminate these restrictions altogether.
IV.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS AS GUARDIANS OF THE RIGHT TO A SECOND CHANCE

2 19

Given the limitations on remedies available under federal law, state
constitutional and statutory claims may offer more, and in some cases the only,
hope for bringing systemic challenges to postconviction penalties. In the face of
inhospitable federal jurisprudence, turning to state courts affords a powerful civil
rights litigation strategy. 220 Indeed, by one commentator's count, at least fortytwo states have given relevant provisions in their own constitutions a more
expansive interpretation than that accorded to similar provisions of the U.S.
Constitution. 22 1 As a result, many civil rights challenges that encountered
resistance in federal courts have succeeded when litigated in state courts using
22 2
state constitutional or statutory provisions.
Legal strategizing must begin with individual advocates identifying the state
represent indigent clients or work on criminal justice issues are increasingly developing programs
to address legal problems faced by individuals released from prison. For example, Community
Legal Services of Philadelphia's Ex-Offender Unit provides legal services to ex-offenders in the
areas of employment, public benefits, family advocacy, public housing and Section 8, and
expungement of criminal records. See Cmty. Legal Servs. of Phila., supra note 143. The Legal
Action Center has established the National H.I.R.E. Network to provide training, technical
assistance, and other services aimed at increasing employment opportunities for people with
criminal records. See Press Release, Legal Action Center, Legal Action Center Appoints New CoDirectors for the National H.I.R.E. Network (June 9, 2005), http://www.hirenetwork.org/
pdfs/Press Release 6-9-05.pdf.
219. Justice Brennan wrote two influential articles encouraging state courts to assume the
role of "guardians of individual rights" and commending those that interpreted their own
constitutions to afford protections beyond those federal courts had found to be guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
535 (1986).
220. See Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, supra note 219, at 548 (1986) ("Between
1970 and 1984, state courts, increasingly reluctant to follow the federal lead, have handed down
over 250 published opinions holding that constitutional minimums set by the United States
Supreme Court were insufficient to satisfy the more stringent requirements of state constitutional
law.").
221. JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 1:7 (2003).
222. Compare, e.g., Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Conn. 1996), and Campaignfor
FiscalEquity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328 (N.Y. 2003), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (state's affirmative duty to provide equal educational
opportunities for socioeconomically disadvantaged students). Compare also, e.g., Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980), with Right to Choose v. Byme, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (N.J. 1982)
(state's obligation to provide funding for abortions). In addition, state courts struck down laws
criminalizing sodomy under their own constitutions well before the U.S. Supreme Court
determined in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), that such laws violate the U.S.
Constitution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (striking down a
statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy under the Kentucky constitution).
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schemes most likely to support successful postconviction challenges.

Most

states have adopted a myriad of sanctions, through legislation, administrative
rules, and municipal ordinances. Similarly, each state may have a number of
constitutional and statutory provisions that could provide a basis for challenging
reentry barriers. The following discussion is not an attempt to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the many possible grounds for state challenges to
postconviction sanctions. Rather, the discussion highlights several state courts'
interpretations of paradigmatic state constitutional and statutory provisions, with
the hope of encouraging advocates to examine whether similar provisions might
be utilized in their own states. 2 23 Although the language and application of
constitutional and statutory provisions will vary from state to state, in this article
we advocate litigating within three general legal frameworks: equal protection
challenges, due process challenges, and challenges under state poverty
provisions.
A. Equal Protection

Several state courts have adopted the same approach to equal protection
analysis under their state constitutions as under the federal constitution. 22 4 In
those states, social and economic legislation, such as limitations on economic
entitlements of ex-offenders, is presumptively valid and will be upheld if the

22 5
classification is merely rationally related to some legitimate state interest.

Some state courts, however, have taken a more rigorous approach to equal
223. Although this article focuses on three possible causes of action, several others exist that
advocates should explore. These strategies include challenges to sanctions as cruel or unusual
punishment, focusing on those states with constitutional provisions prohibiting "cruel or unusual"
punishment as opposed to "cruel and unusual" punishment. Nineteen states have constitutional
provisions that outlaw cruel or unusual punishment. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 15; ARK. CONST. OF
1874 art. 2, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; RAW. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. BILL OF
RIGHTS § 9 (1968); LA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 26;
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 28; NEV. CONST. art.
I, § 6; N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 33; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; Wvo. CONST. art. I, § 14. In two of these states, California and
Michigan, courts have expressly found that the use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that the
provision provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
uses the conjunctive "and." People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Mich. 1992); People v.
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Cal. 1972).
224. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 525 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa 1994) (noting that in an equal
protection context, "[t]he scrutiny of a challenged statute is the same under both the United States
and Iowa constitutions"); Gora v. City of Femdale, 576 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Mich. 1998) ("[Wle do
not find in the wording used, nor in its arrangement, any evidence of purpose on the part of the
drafters to provide broader protection in the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution than
is found in its federal counterpart." (quoting Doe v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166, 175
(Mich. 1992))) (alteration in the original)) See also Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (1985) ("Most state courts ... have not
developed doctrine independent of the federal equal protection clause under [state] equality
provisions.").
225. See, e.g., Kelly, 525 N.W.2d at 411 (finding that the state could rationally have decided
"for economic reasons" not to give equal pay increases to union and nonunion employees alike).
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These courts apply heightened equal protection review to a

broader range of rights than the federal constitution, such as the right to
education. 2 27 Alternately, though technically applying lower level rational basis

scrutiny, courts in these states may apply a more rigorous analysis than
the highly deferential federal rational basis review. 22 8

For example, despite

insufficient proof of intentional discrimination, some state courts have struck
down statutes that have a racially disparate impact using the rational basis
standard under the state constitution, whereas federal courts would apply a more
22 9
deferential review.
Accordingly, economic and social restrictions on ex-offenders should be

challenged under state equal protection clauses that have been interpreted to

226. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 895 P.2d 99, 103 (Alaska 1995) ("Alaska's equal protection
clause may be more protective of individual rights than the federal equal protection clause. In
analyzing equal protection issues under the Alaska Constitution, we have rejected the traditional
two-tiered federal approach in favor of a more flexible 'sliding scale' test.") (citations omitted);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (finding that the Common Benefits Clause in the
Vermont Constitution guarantees committed same-sex couples the statutory benefits and
protections provided to opposite-sex married couples). One commentator has offered an
explanation of this trend: "[S]ince the rise of the New Federalism, at least twenty-one states have
ruled that the equality guarantees in their state constitutions afford more expansive protection that
[sic] the Federal Equal Protection Clause." Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State
ConstitutionalLaw, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1020-21 (2003).
227. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (finding that
the equal protection guarantee in the state constitution requires equal educational opportunity);
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 949-51 (Cal. 1977) (finding, under the state constitution, that
education is a fundamental right and that discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of
district wealth is a suspect classification); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977)
("[Iln Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that
right must be strictly scrutinized."); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (holding
that education is a fundamental right and therefore the equal protection guarantee in the state
constitution requires application of strict scrutiny to any discriminatory classifications in the
education financing system). Similarly, other state courts have suggested that under state equality
guarantees, classifications such as sex or sexual orientation are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 365 A.2d 1118, 1123-24 (Conn. 1976) (noting that the passage of the
state equal rights amendment could require application of strict scrutiny to classifications on the
basis of sex); People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (11. 1974) (holding that "a classification based
on sex is a suspect classification" and is subject to strict scrutiny); Tanner v. Or. Health Scis.
Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that classifications on the basis of sexual
orientation are suspect under the equality guarantee in the state constitution).
228. See, e.g., Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 583-85 (Iowa 1980) (applying rigorous
rational basis review under state constitution to strike down tort liability statute similar to that
upheld under weaker federal rational basis review). See also Williams, supra note 224, at 1219
("Under the first [methodology], the state court adopts the federal frame of analysis but applies
those constructs independently. Under the second, courts reject the federal constructs and apply
their own analytical frameworks." (footnote omitted)).
229. Compare, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (using the state
constitution's more rigorous rational basis standard to strike down state sentencing guidelines with
a disparate impact on African Americans), with U.S. v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to apply strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to federal sentencing guidelines
because plaintiff failed to prove that racial animus was a motivating factor in the enactment of
the guidelines).

Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

20061

THE LAND OF SECOND CHANCES

provide stronger protection than the federal counterpart. While the precise
standard may vary from state to state, any analysis that guarantees more
searching review than a near-irrebuttable presumption of validity provides an
opportunity for the court to understand why denying housing, employment, or
welfare to those with criminal records unfairly and unjustifiably discriminates
against those individuals. 2 30 Wyoming will be used to illustrate this type of
challenge. Wyoming's equal protection guarantee "'mandates that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike, both in privileges conferred and in the
liabilities imposed."'' 23 1 This guarantee offers more protection than the Federal
Equal Protection Clause. 2 32 Until recently, Wyoming counted itself among the
group of fifteen states that continue to permanently deny cash assistance and
food stamp benefits to individuals convicted of drug-related felons. 233 Although

230. The example of Wyoming used in the following discussion illustrates a state that applies
a more searching rational basis review to all social and economic legislation than the rational basis
review afforded under the Federal Constitution. Certain states provide such heightened review to
certain rights that explicitly are afforded special treatment under other provisions of the
constitution. For example, in Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Mont.
1986), the Supreme Court of Montana chose to apply a middle-tier standard of review (between
rational basis scrutiny and strict scrutiny) to a statute that eliminated certain welfare benefits in
light of a state constitutional provision that required the legislature to "provide necessary
assistance to the misfortunate." The court found that a benefit grounded in the state constitution
"is an interest whose abridgement requires something more than a rational relationship to a
governmental objective." Id. at 1313-14. Given the fact that the state constitution recognized the
need to provide welfare benefits to the poor, the court saw a need to articulate a substantive midlevel analysis ....
[because] .. "[t]he old rational basis test allows government to discriminate
among classes of people for the most whimsical reasons." Id. at 1314.
231. . Allhusen v. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo.
1995) (quoting Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 1984)). Wyoming's equal protection
guarantee is derived from several different provisions of the state constitution. Id. See Wvo.
CONST. art. I, § 2 ("In their inherent right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members
of the human race are equal."); id. art. I, § 3 ("[T]he laws of this state affecting the political rights
and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or
condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a
court of competent jurisdiction."); id. art. I, § 34 ("All laws of a general nature shall have a
uniform operation."); id. art. III, § 27 ("The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of
the following enumerated cases, that is to say: For... granting to any corporation, association
or individual ... any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever .... In all
other cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.")
232. Allhusen, 898 P.2d at 884. See also Wilson v. State, 841 P.2d 90, 95 (Wyo. 1992);
Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1992).
233. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SUMMARY-LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES (State Modifications Updated April 2006),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs 03.cfm (last visited April 18, 2006). When Congress
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, see supra
notes 105-07, Wyoming implemented the federal ban in its entirety, permanently denying food
stamps and cash assistance to individuals with felony drug convictions. Personal Opportunities
with Employment Responsibilities ("POWER"), Wyo. Dept. of Family Services Doc. No. 4565
Ch. 1, § 6(a)(ii)(G)(IV) (Oct. 9, 2001) (superseded), available at http://soswy.state.wy.us/
RuleSearchMain.asp; http://soswy.state.wy.us/RULES/4565.pdf. In March 2005, the Wyoming
legislature passed a statute exempting Wyoming residents from the federal TANF ban. Public
Assistance and Social Services Act, 2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws 530-31 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN.
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Wyoming has now opted out of the lifetime TANF ban, it provides a useful
example of state equal protection jurisprudence exacting enough to sustain a
viable challenge to socioeconomic reentry barriers. Advocates in states that
continue to impose the TANF ban or other prohibitions against ex-offenders
should examine whether their state's equal protection jurisprudence supports a
challenge similar to the one described below using Wyoming law.
Wyoming courts, like the federal courts, have adopted a two-tiered approach
to equal protection analysis, applying strict scrutiny where a suspect class or
fundamental right is implicated and a rational relationship test where ordinary interests are involved.23 4 Recognizing the state constitution's particular
prohibition against discrimination based on any circumstance or condition, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has held that "the state constitution, even at the lowest
traditional scrutiny level, empowers courts to scrutinize classification legislation
more carefully than they can under federal doctrine." 2 35 The State's rational
relationship test involves four inquiries: (1) [W]hat is "the harm or burden[]
occasioned by the legislation and... has [the class harmed] been subjected to a tradition of disfavor"; (2) "[W]hat is the governmental purpose being
served by the classification"; (3) "what is the characteristic of the group that
justifies the disparate treatment"; and (4) "How are the characteristics used to
distinguish people for.., disparate treatment relevant to the purpose that the
challenged laws purportedly intend to serve? ' 236 The test seeks to ensure that the
characteristic the group is presumed to share is actually relevant to a valid
public purpose.

2 37

The first prong of the test examines the harm to the class and determines
23 8
whether the group has been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor" by the laws.
"That a classification disadvantages a traditionally disfavored class signals the
23 9
likelihood that the classification is a product of stereotypical thinking."
Wyoming's prior adoption of the TANF ban clearly harmed those convicted of
drug offenses. The ban on welfare benefits permanently denied those convicted of drug-related felonies financial assistance to support themselves and
§ 42-2-103 (2005)). The Wyoming legislature did not pass legislative findings explaining its
decision to opt out of the federal TANF ban. As of July 1, 2005, individuals with felony drug
convictions are eligible for TANF assistance. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, 2005
STATE PLAN DOCUMENT: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 1, 24 (Jan., 2005).
234. Hays v. State, 768 P.2d 11, 15 (Wyo. 1989).
235. Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165 (quoting Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming
ConstitutionalInterpretation,XXI LAND & WATER L. REV. 527, 553 (1986)). The court found the

Federal Constitution's application of heightened scrutiny for those laws seeking to "distribute
benefits or burdens because of race, color, alienage, sex, or illegitimacy is inadequate for
protection against legislative discrimination based on any other characteristic other than individual
incompetency," as required by the Wyoming Constitution. Id.
236. Id. at 166-67.
237. Id. at 165.
238. Id. at 166 (quoting Note, Justice Stevens' Equal ProtectionJurisprudence,100 HARV. L.

REv. 1146, 1146 (1987)).
239. Id. (quoting Note, supra note 240, at 1155)
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their families. Many women in prison lack sufficient resources or social support
to help them make the transition from prison to the community. 240 The federal
ban seriously hinders an ex-offender's ability to care for her children, find work,
and access drug-treatment services. 24 1 Ex-drug offenders, like other exoffenders, are likely to have a difficult time securing employment because of a
lack of employment skills, the stigma associated with a criminal record,24 2 and
employment and licensing restrictions. 2 43 The ban thus undermines hopes of
survival by legitimate means in the outside world. 24 4 Furthermore, ex-drug
offenders (and ex-offenders generally) have been subjected to a tradition of
disfavor by the law. Wyoming law includes several examples of discrimination
against individuals with felony convictions, including the denial of public
housing, 24 5 certain forms of employment, 2 46 and voting rights, 24 7 and until

recently, the denial of public assistance. 24 8 In 1992, the Wyoming Supreme
Court overturned a statute requiring that individuals under the age of eighteen
lose their driver's licenses if convicted of any drug- or alcohol-related offense
because those individuals were politically powerless and especially deserving of
judicial protection. 24 9 Individuals with felony drug convictions in Wyoming are
likewise "'politically powerless' since they are deprived of the right to vote and
thus unable to make legislators directly accountable for [their] disparate

240. ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES, supra note 102, at 8 ("Nationally, Department of Justice data
show that nearly [thirty percent] of women in prison have been on welfare in the month prior to
their arrest, and as such we anticipate a significant number of women will require public assistance
immediately upon their release from prison.").
241. See id at 10-24.
242. Cynthia Godsoe, The Ban on Welfare for Felony Drug Offenders: Giving a New
Meaning to "Life Sentence, " 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 266 (1998). See Allhusen v. State,
898 P.2d 878, 886 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that licensing requirements prohibiting unlicensed
counselors employed by private institutions from having any patient contact harmed those
counselors because, among other things, it may not be possible for those individuals to obtain
employment in public or educational institutions).
243. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
244. See Godsoe, supra note 242, at 262-63.
245. See, e.g., Cheyenne Housing Authority, Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policy
for Public Housing, § 8.4 (amended Mar. 29, 2005) (on file with the author) (listing criminal
activity as one of the grounds for denial of public housing).
246. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-704(b)(iv) (2005) (peace officer); WYO. ST. ANN. § 91-710(b)(iv) (2005) (correction officer); Wyo. ST. ANN. § 31-16-103(c)(vii) (2005) (car dealer);
005-000 WYO. CODE R. .CH. 1, § 9 (Weil 1995) (private school administrator). Conviction of a
crime may also be considered as a basis to deny an applicant for state public employment. 006 140
WYO. CODE. R. Ch. 3, § 2(a)(xv) (Weil 2006).
247. WYo. CONST. art. 6, § 6 ("All persons... convicted of felonies, unless restored to civil
rights, are excluded from the elective franchise.").
248. Personal Opportunities with Employment Responsibilities (POWER), Wyo. Dept. of
Family Services Doc. No. 4565 Ch. 1, § 6(a)(ii)(G)(IV) (Oct. 9, 2001), superseded by
049 187 WYo. CODE R. ch. 1, § 6 (Weil 2005), available at http://soswy.state.wy.us/
RuleSearchMain.asp, and http://soswy.state.wy.us/RULES/4565.pdf.
249. See Johnson, 838 P.2d, at 166.
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treatment." 250 In fact, proponents often cite this as the very purpose of felony
disenfranchisement statutes. 2 5 1 In light of these restrictions, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has already found that ex-offenders fulfill the requirements of the
first prong of Wyoming's equal protection analysis:
It is fair to state that members of this class, persons on probation, parole,
or bail, have been subject to a tradition of disfavor by our laws.
Public policy traditionally has assumed it is necessary to impose special
requirements as to conduct, freedom of 2 movement,
and other
52
responsibilities upon those members in this class.

The second prong of Wyoming's test identifies the governmental purpose of
the legislation. 25 3 In implementing the federal welfare ban, Wyoming did not
pass separate legislation or provide an independent rationale for the
restriction. 2 54 The Wyoming Department of Family Services promulgated rules
to implement the federal ban, pursuant to the Department's authority under
legislation mandating the provision of public assistance and social services to
those unable to support themselves. 2 55 As discussed above in Turner v.
Glickman, a federal court of appeals held that the ban on TANF assistance does
25 6
not violate federal equal protection or substantive due process requirements.
When Wyoming implemented the lifetime welfare ban, it would likely have
adopted the purposes offered in Turner v. Glickman : "(1) deterring drug use; (2)
257
reducing fraud in the food stamp program; and (3) curbing welfare spending."
The third prong of Wyoming's rational basis test demands inquiry into what
characteristics shared by individuals convicted of drug-related crimes justify the
disparate treatment. 25 8 The Wyoming Supreme Court has made clear that
"the characteristic ascribed to the group to justify the classification must also rest
on more than conjecture." 259 Therefore, the State would have to show that

250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967) ("A man who
breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have been
thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further administering the compact. On a less
theoretical plane, it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of
serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who
enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to
consider their cases.").
252. Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 1354 (Wyo. 1996).
253. Johnson, 838 P.2d at 166.
254. See 049 187 WYO. CODE R. Ch.1 § 1 (Weil 2005).
255. The Public Assistance and Social Services Law provides: "The department shall provide
and administer programs for public assistance and social services in Wyoming to those individuals
lacking sufficient income or resources to provide themselves or their families with a reasonable
subsistence compatible with decency and health or with services necessary for their well-being."
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-103(a) (2005).

256.
257.
258.
259.

Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2000).
See id., at 424-26.
Johnson, 838 P.2d at 166.
Id. at 167.
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persons convicted of drug crimes share some common characteristic that justifies
singling them out for denial of welfare in the interest of deterring drug abuse,
reducing fraud, or reducing welfare spending. "It is important to the understanding of equal protection not to confuse commonly shared prejudices with
relevance. ' '26° Other than the fact that they were all convicted for drug-related
crimes, this class of individuals may have very little in common that justifies
grouping them together for disparate treatment. The legislation lumps together
those convicted of charges ranging from simple possession to drug sales or
trafficking, yet regulations that may deter fraud by someone convicted of
possession may not deter fraud by those convicted of trafficking.
The final prong of Wyoming's equal protection analysis addresses whether
26
these characteristics in question are relevant to the purpose of the regulation. '
2 62
None of the justifications advanced in Turner can withstand careful scrutiny.
There is no evidence that a permanent denial of public assistance would deter
drug use. 26 3 In addition, "[g]iven the extremely harsh sentences that drug
offenders already face, [the threat of loss of welfare benefits] cannot seriously be
viewed as a deterrent.
,,264 Similarly, denying welfare to drug offenders is
not a reasonable means to deter fraud among welfare participants.
The justifications for the ban are further undermined by its overbreadth and
underinclusion in the class of individuals subject to the ban. If the motivation
behind this legislation is to prevent fraud, those burdened should not be those
convicted of drug-related offenses, but rather those who have been convicted of
crimes with fraud as a factor or underlying element. Similarly, if one of the true
goals is deterring drug use, there are more tailored means to achieve this
rationale, such as a freeze-out period rather than a permanent ban, or an
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. The Turner court did not require any evidentiary basis for the contention that the welfare
ban furthered the proffered justifications. Turner, 207 F.3d at 425-26. Instead, the court merely

found that it was not irrational for Congress to conclude that the law would deter drug abuse and
welfare fraud. Id.
263. See Godsoe, supra note 242, at 262 ("Like the emphasis on punishment and
incarceration driving the 'war on drugs,' the lifetime ban on public assistance fails to address the
underlying causes of drug abuse and trafficking in our society, such as poverty, and a lack of
employment or educational opportunities."). Indeed, the tough criminal penalties imposed by the

war on drugs have failed to solve the addiction problem in America. Id.; Rubinstein & Mukamal,
supra note 1. It is hard to imagine that where the war on drugs has failed, denial of welfare
benefits will be the cure. On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that substance abuse
treatment is the most effective means of addressing drug addiction. Godsoe, supra note 242, at
263.
264. Recent Legislation, Welfare Reform-Punishment of Drug Offenders-Congress Denies

Cash Assistance and Food Stamps to Drug Felons, 110 HARV. L. REV. 983, 988 (1997) (noting
further that if the prospect of spending twenty years in prison does not deter an individual from
committing a drug related offense, it is unlikely that the possibility of losing welfare benefits upon
release will do so). A person convicted under Wyoming state law of manufacture, delivery, or
possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance could face incarceration for
up to twenty years. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031 (LexisNexis 2005).
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exception for rehabilitation. The Wyoming ban singles out drug offenders for
punishment, while leaving those convicted of fraud, and every other crime, free
to obtain benefits. In Johnson v. State Hearing Examiners, the Wyoming
Supreme Court found "no evidence from which [the] court can infer the
relevance between suspending the driver's license of those less than nineteen
years of age but not those nineteen or twenty to the purported purpose of
improving highway safety or deterring the illegal use or possession of
alcohol. '2 65 Likewise, a Wyoming court applying careful scrutiny to the
justifications for the lifetime welfare ban for drug offenders is likely to find that
the ban violates equal protection.
Moreover, the welfare ban was inconsistent with the overall purpose of
Wyoming's welfare legislation. The public assistance legislation provides that
the State "shall provide and administer programs for public assistance and social
services in Wyoming to those individuals lacking sufficient income or resources
to provide themselves or their families with a reasonable subsistence compatible
26 6
with decency and health or with services necessary for their well-being."
Permanently denying welfare based on a single drug conviction frustrates this
purpose because it deprives those individuals of public assistance without regard
to the fact that they may lack sufficient income or resources to support
themselves and their families. The State must support the relevance of the
restriction with more than just conjecture, and must provide some substantive
2 67
basis for the relationship between the classification and legislative purpose.
State equal protection provisions may also provide an avenue to challenge
economic-entitlement prohibitions that have a racially discriminatory impact.
Some courts have already invalidated legislation because of its disproportionate effect on African Americans without requiring proof of intentional
discrimination. For example, in State v. Russell,26 8 the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied a self-described "stricter standard of rational basis review" under
the state equal protection guarantee than is available under the federal
constitution, and struck down a sentencing scheme that imposed longer
sentences for possession of crack/cocaine than for possession of the same
quantity of powdered cocaine. 2 69 The plaintiffs introduced statistical evidence
265. 838 P.2d at 167.
266. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-103(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
267. See Alihusen, 898 P.2d at 888 (finding that Wyoming's justification for prohibiting
supervision of unlicensed counselors by licensed counselors in private, for-profit institutions but
not in public or charitable institutions was based on conjecture and unsupported by any evidence);
Johnson, 838 P.2d at 167.
268. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
269. Id. at 887, 889. According to the court, heightened rational basis review is appropriate
"where the challenged classification appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden on
the very class of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal protection." Id. at 889.
The court suggested that the racial disparity in punishment "cries out for closer scrutiny" and that
"the statistics showing the effect of the statute in operation combined with relevant factors that
appear in the statute's history could be held to create an inference of invidious discrimination
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that: "[A] far greater percentage of [African Americans] than [W]hites are
sentenced for possession of three or more grams of crack/cocaine under Minn.
Stat. § 152.023 with more severe consequences than their white counterparts
who possess three or more grams of cocaine powder." 270 Judges in other states
have also suggested that in appropriate cases, courts may be27willing
to carefully
1
scrutinize statutes that have a disproportionate racial impact.
Similarly, litigating welfare bans, legal advocates may be able to
demonstrate that such a restriction has a disproportionate impact on people of
color, particularly women of color. As a result of racially biased drug policies
and enforcement of drug laws, African Americans and Latinos represent
a disproportionate number of people convicted for drug offenses. 27 2 The
Sentencing Project reports that "[a]lthough African Americans represent only
13% of monthly drug users, a number consistent with their proportion of the
population, they account for 35% of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of
drug possession convictions, and 74% of those sentenced to prison for drug
possession." 2 73 In addition, "as a result of race and gender based socioeconomic
which would trigger the need for satisfaction of a compelling state interest not shown on the
record[.]" Id. at 888 n.2. Nonetheless, the court did not decide this issue, having found instead
that the statute failed Minnesota's rational basis test. Id.
270. Id. at 887.
271. See, e.g., Ex parte Wooden, 670 So. 2d 892, 897 (Ala. 1995) (Cook, J., concurring
specially) (noting that a "properly presented challenge [to the drug sentencing statute at
issueIshould invoke a [searching] standard of review under the Alabama constitution"). The
opinion also "acknowledge[d] the gravity of the federal and state constitutional issues implicated
by these statutes." Id. at 894. Citing national statistics on the racial impact of drug sentencing
laws and referring to the Russell decision, Justice Cook noted that the Minnesota rational basis test
closely resembles the test Alabama has applied in challenges under its own equal protection clause.
Id. at 895-97. Similarly, in Stephens v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court considered an equal
protection challenge based on statistics showing that the application of a statute imposing a
mandatory life sentence upon a second drug conviction was racially skewed against African
Americans. 456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga. 1995). Although the four justice majority held that the
statistics presented were insufficient to establish an equal protection claim, the court left open the
question of "whether statistical evidence alone can ever be sufficient to prove an allegation of
discriminatory intent in sentencing under the Georgia Constitution." Id. at 562. Two of the three
dissenting justices advocated for a new standard under the Georgia Constitution, based on the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Under this standard, where a
defendant establishes, through statistical evidence, "a prima facie showing sufficient to raise an
inference of unequal application of the statute," the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate
that the decisions were based on "permissible racially neutral selection criteria." Stephens at 570
(Benham, P.J., dissenting, joined by Sears, J.) (internal quotations omitted).
272. ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES, supra note 102, at 25-26. The Sentencing Project found that

in twenty-one states that impose a lifetime ban on welfare benefits, forty-eight percent of women
ineligible to receive benefits under the ban from 1996 to 1999 were African American or Latina.
Id. at 6. "In five states African-American women represent the majority of women subject to the
ban - Alabama (61%), Delaware (65%), Illinois (Cook County) (86%), Mississippi (54%), and
Virginia (63%)." Id.
273. Id. at 26 (citations and internal quotations omitted). African Americans and Latinos
convicted of drug crimes yielding long sentences account, in large part, for the incarceration
explosion over the last thirty years. See Chris Weaver & Will Purcell, The Prison Industrial
Complex: A Modern Justificationfor African Enslavement?, 41 How. L.J. 349, 349-50 (1998).
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inequalities, African American and Latina mothers are highly susceptible to
poverty and as such, are disproportionately represented in the welfare
system." 2 74 Advocates should develop this kind of statistical evidence at the
national and state level, together with evidence of the historical and social
context of race in the criminal justice and welfare systems to support state
constitutional challenges on the grounds that welfare bans are racially
discriminatory.

2 75

B. Due Process
The Due Process Clause "provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests." 2 76 Even where no fundamental right is implicated, substantive due
process prohibits statutory impositions that are completely arbitrary and lacking
any rational connection to a legitimate governmental interest. 27 7 In contrast,
procedural due process allows a deprivation of an individual liberty or property
interest to stand so long as the implementation of the constraint comports with
fundamental concepts of fairness; most often a state satisfies procedural due
process guarantees by providing notice and an opportunity to be heard.278
Because the most effective relief stems from eliminating reentry barriers
altogether, rather than simply assuring adequate procedural safeguards, this
discussion focuses only on substantive due process claims. While some states
apply traditional federal standards in interpreting their own due process
provisions, others have opted for a more liberal application of due process
protections.

27 9

With notable recent successes striking down employment barriers to reentry
under state law, state due process theories offer a particularly bright ray of hope
for dismantling postconviction penalties. For example, Pennsylvania courts
recently struck down separate statutes barring individuals with criminal
274. ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES, supra note102, at 2.
275. In addition to a disparate impact theory, this inextricable relationship between the racism
endemic to America's drug policies and history of racial discrimination that has restricted African
American women's access to welfare may provide another basis to establish that the welfare ban is
racially discriminatory. In interpreting state equality provisions, state courts may look to the
context and history in which discriminatory welfare provisions are enacted, rather than relying
exclusively on purposeful intent to establish racial discrimination. See Risa E. Kaufman, supra
note 161, at 321-26 (citing the Massachusetts Supreme Court's active protection of civil liberties
under the state constitution and, in desegregation cases, its willingness to explore context and
history in discerning race discrimination, Kauffman argues that state equal protection guarantees
may offer a vehicle to challenge welfare provisions that, although facially race-neutral, are rooted
in the history of racial discrimination against African American women and racist stereotypes and
myths surrounding welfare recipients).
276. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
277. Id. at 728.
278. See Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
377-78 (1971).
279. State ConstitutionalRights, supra note 159, at 1467-69.
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convictions from employment as service providers for children and the
elderly. 280 The Pennsylvania Constitution's due process clause protects the
"right to engage in any of the common occupations of life. '28 1 Furthermore,
when weighty interests in protecting vulnerable populations are at issue, the
Pennsylvania legislature must not "'run[] afoul of the deeply ingrained public
policy of [the] State to avoid unwarranted
stigmatization of and unreasonable
282
offenders."'
former
upon
restrictions
Nixon v. Commonwealth28 3 involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Older
Adults Protective Services Act ("OAPSA") 28 4 by five individuals who were
either terminated from their current position or denied a position because of prior
convictions. 2 85 The criminal records provision of OAPSA required "new
applicants and those employees who had been at a facility for less than a year
before the effective date of the Act to submit criminal record reports," and
"permanently prohibit[ed] a covered facility from hiring or retaining those
persons whose criminal records established that they had been convicted of any
one of the enumerated crimes." 28 6 In affirming the lower court's decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that one of the rights guaranteed under
article 1, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the due process right to
pursue a lawful occupation. 28 7 However, the court noted that because "[t]he
right to engage in a particular occupation ...is not a fundamental right," the
rational basis test was appropriate. 288 Pennsylvania applies a "more restrictive
rational basis test" under its due process clause than is applied under the federal
280. Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 281 (Pa. 2003); Warren County Human Servs.
v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 844 A.2d 70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
281. Warren County, 844 A.2d at 73.
282. Id. at 74 (quoting Sec'y of Revenue v. John's Vending Corp., 309 A.2d 358, 362
(Pa. 1973)). Challenges to employment restrictions can also be brought under procedural due
process guarantees in state constitutions. For example, a Massachusetts court struck down
regulations barring job applicants who had been convicted of certain crimes from municipal
employment because applicants were given no opportunity to rebut the inference that their
convictions made their employment a safety risk. Cronin v. O'Leary, No. 00-1713-F, 2001 WL
919969 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001). The court found that the statute violated procedural due
process under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Id. at *7.
283. 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003).
284. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225 (West 2003).
285. Nixon, 839 A.2d. at 279-83. One of the individuals was not laid off because he had
been employed in his job for more than a year before the statute was enacted, but the court noted
that he was nonetheless prohibited from ever working at another facility covered by the statute. Id.
at 283.
286. Id. at 281. The enumerated crimes included any drug-related felony, criminal homicide,
aggravated assault, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, sexual assault (including statutory sexual
assault), arson, burglary, robbery, forgery, incest, intimidation of witnesses, and prostitution. Id. at
281-82.
287. Id. at 288. Article 1, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "All men are
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
288. Nixon, 839 A.2d at 288.
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constitution. Pennsylvania courts require a showing that the classification bears
a "real and substantial relation" to the interest the legislature is seeking to
achieve. 289 Applying this standard, the court reasoned:
Here, it is clear that no such real and substantial relationship exists. If
the goal of the criminal records chapter is ... to protect the
Commonwealth's vulnerable citizens from those deemed incapable of
safely providing for them, there was simply no basis to distinguish
caretakers with convictions who had been fortunate enough to hold a
single job since July 1, 1997, i.e., a year before the effective date of the
chapter, from those who may have successfully worked in the industry
for more than a year but had not held one continuous job in a covered
facility since July 1, 1997.
The only conceivable explanation for the distinction ...isthat the
General Assembly determined that those persons convicted of the
disqualifying crimes who had been working at a covered facility for
more than a year presented less of a risk because they had proven that
they were not likely to harm the patient population and had established
a degree of trust with their patients and management. However, if
convicted criminals who had been working at a covered facility for
more than a year as of July 1, 1998, were capable of essentially
rehabilitating themselves so as to qualify them to continue working in a
covered facility, there should be no reason why other convicted
290
criminals were not, and are not, also capable of doing the same.
Significantly, three justices filed concurrences to preserve their opinion that
the court should have reached its decision on broader grounds, arguing that the
statute was unconstitutional because a "lifetime ban [on employment] which
arises from the broad class of prior convictions covered by [OAPSA] has no
rational relationship to the legitimate, desired end of protecting the elderly,
291
disabled and infirm from victimization."
Relying on Nixon, a lower court in Warren County Human Services v. State
Civil Services Commission,292 struck down the ban imposed by Pennsylvania's
Child Protective Services Law ("CPSL") on hiring applicants convicted of
certain violent and sexual crimes. 2 93 Edward Roberts worked as a caseworker
for the Forest/Warren County Department of Human Services from January
2001 until December 2001, when the Department was reorganized. 294 When he
29 5
was hired, Mr. Edwards disclosed his 1980 conviction for aggravated assault.
After the reorganization, Mr. Edwards was rehired in April 2002 and terminated
289. Id. at 287 & n.15.
290. Id. at 289 (footnotes omitted).
291. Id. at 291 (Cappy, C.J., joined by Newman, J., concurring, and Castille, J., concurring).
292. 844 A.2d 70 (Pa. Commw. Ct 2004).
293. Id. at 73-74.
294. Id. at 71.

295. Id.
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two months later, based on the CPSL's lifetime ban on hiring anyone for "a
position with direct client contact if they have previously been convicted" of an
enumerated crime. 296 The court held that the CPSL failed the rational basis test
because, like the statute at issue in Nixon, it "prohibit[ed] the hiring of applicants
previously convicted of certain enumerated crimes [but did] not ban existing
employees from continuing to work in the child-care field, despite having a
similar conviction." 29 7 The court also found that the lifetime employment ban
bore no rational relationship to the state interest in protecting children.2 98 On the
contrary, the court found that the ban "' [ran] afoul of the deeply ingrained public
stigmatization of and unreasonable
policy of [the] State to avoid unwarranted
29 9
restrictions upon former offenders.'
Using Nixon and Warner as templates, advocates in search of state law due
process theories should explore whether their state generally adopts a more
rigorous approach to due process than the federal analysis, or specifically
accords strong protections to the right to work. The courts in Nixon and Warner
grounded their decision in the constitutional right to earn a livelihood, a
guarantee that had been protected by Pennsylvania courts in the past. 30 0 In other
states, the word "liberty," as used in state due process clauses, may include the
liberty to pursue any livelihood or lawful vocation. 30 1 A number of other state
296. Id. at 71-72. The court noted that the statute, in relevant part, applied to "all prospective
employees of childcare services, prospective foster parents, prospective adoptive parents,
prospective self-employed family daycare providers and other persons seeking to provide childcare
services under contract with a childcare facility or program." Id. at 71 n.2. Any such applicant
could not be hired if he or she had previously been convicted of aggravated
assault or a number of other crimes, including "kidnapping, robbery, indecent assault,
sexual assault and prostitution, or if they have been listed in the central register as the perpetrator
of child abuse or convicted of a felony related to drugs in the last five years." Id.
297. Id. at 74.
298. Id.
299. Id. (citing Sec'y of Revenue v. John's Vending Corp., 309 A.2d 358, 362 (Pa. 1973)).
In John 's Vending, the court held that under the Cigarette Tax Act, which precluded granting
licenses to companies whose officers had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,
"where the prior convictions do not in anyway [sic] reflect upon the appellant's present ability to
properly discharge the responsibilities required by the position. .. the convictions cannot provide a
basis for revocation of a wholesaler's license." 309 A.2d at 362. The court noted:
This State in recent years has been unalterably committed to rehabilitation of those
persons who have been convicted of criminal offenses. To forever foreclose a
permissible means of gainful employment because of an improvident act in the distant
past completely loses sight of any concept of forgiveness for prior errant behavior and
adds yet another stumbling block along the difficult road of rehabilitation.
Id.
300. See, e.g., Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n., 311 A.2d 634, 640 (Pa. 1973) (noting, in a
case involving limitations on a physician's hospital privileges, that the state constitution forbids the
legislature to "impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations"
(citation omitted)); Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954) (holding similarly,
in a case involving restrictions imposed on retail sellers of liquid fuels), cited in Nixon 839 A.2d at
286, and Warren, 844 A.2d at 73.
301. See, e.g., Toney v. State, 37 So. 332, 333-34 (Ala. 1904) (striking down a statute that
interfered with the right to make contracts for employment in violation of the due process

Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

N.YU. REVIEW OF LAW& SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 30:527

courts have held that their state constitutions' due process clauses protect the
right to earn a livelihood and pursue a lawful occupation. For example, the
Alabama Supreme Court explained in early jurisprudence that the liberty
protected by the due process clause
embrace[s] the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation, and for the purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.... A
person living under the protection of this government has the right to
adopt and follow any lawful industrial
pursuit, not injurious to the
30 2
community, which he may see fit.
30 3
Some states explicitly afford the right to work a higher level of scrutiny.
For example, on several occasions, North Carolina courts have given greater
protection over individual liberties than the federal constitution. 3°4 The North
Carolina Constitution declares that among the inalienable rights of the people are
"life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness," 30 5 and that "[n]o person shall be ...deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land."' 30 6 Although the "law of the land"

provision is sometimes said to be synonymous with the Due Process Clause of
the federal constitution, North Carolina courts have made it clear that the clause
guarantees in the federal and state constitutions).
302. Toney, 37 So. at 333-34 (internal quotations omitted). See also, e.g., State v. McMillan,
319 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ga. 1984) ("A person's right to work, namely the right to accept employment
from private firms and individuals, is protected by our state due process clause."); De Berry v. City
of La Grange, 8 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940) ("The right to earn a living by pursuing an
ordinary occupation is protected by the constitution. This right is fundamental, natural, inherent,
and is one of the most sacred and valuable rights of a citizen. [Her] business of calling is properly
within the meaning of the due process clause of the constitution."). One Alabama court noted:
[O]ur decisions.., hold that the liberty which is so sedulously guarded by the
Constitution "includes the right to pursue any useful and harmless occupation,
and to conduct the business in the citizens' own way, without being discriminated
against either by being prohibited from engaging in it or by being burdened with
discriminative taxation.
Ala. Indep. Serv. Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 6 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1962) (quoting City Council
of Montgomery v. Kelly, 38 So. 67, 69 (Ala. 1905)). See also Ironworkers Local No. 67 v. Hart,
191 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 1971) ("[T]he Iowa Constitution declares all men are, by nature,
free and equal. This freedom and equality must and does extend into the areas of ...employment
practices. No working man should be deprived of the right to earn his industrial way on free and
equal terms." (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
303. Two examples are North Carolina, see infra notes 305-13 and accompanying text, and
Montana, see Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1171 (Mont. 1996) (holding that the opportunity
to pursue employment is a fundamental right under the state constitution).
304. See Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties": North Carolina
Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1749, 1751-57 (1992) (describing a number of illustrative
cases).
305. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
306. Id. § 19.
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may provide greater relief than the Federal Due Process Clause and applies30 a7
more rigorous review than the rationality standard applied in federal cases.
Legislation satisfies the restraints imposed by the law of the land clause if it is
not "'unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,. .. and [if] the means selected...
30 8
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."'
North Carolina courts have held that the North Carolina constitution
"creates a right to conduct a lawful business or to earn a livelihood that is
'fundamental' for purposes of state constitutional analysis." 30 9 As the Treants
court explained, "'[a] State cannot under the guise of protecting the public
arbitrarily interfere with private businesses or prohibit lawful occupations or
impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions on them."' 3 10 While the court
307. See Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
("Although the 'law of the land' is sometimes considered synonymous with Fourteenth
Amendment 'due process of law,' our state Supreme Court has reserved the right to grant relief
against unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious legislation under our state constitution in
circumstances under which no relief might be granted by federal court interpretations of due
process." (citations omitted)) See also Louis Bilionis, Liberty, the "Law of the Land, " and
Abortion in North Carolina, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1839, 1845-46 (1993) ("Since very early in their
state's constitutional history, North Carolinians have understood the safeguards of the "law of the
land" to include the protections of a rigorous, yet responsible, judicial review ... akin to the
heightened judicial scrutiny of official action associated with substantive due process
jurisprudence under the federal Due Process Clause.").
308. Bilionis, supra note 307, at 1848 (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting McNeil
v. Harnett County, 398 S.E.2d 475, 482 (1990)).
309. Treants, 350 S.E.2d at 371. Accord Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 854 (N.C. 1957)
("The right to work and to earn a livelihood is a property right that cannot be taken away except
under the police power of the State in the paramount public interest for reasons of health, safety,
morals, or public welfare."); McCormick v. Proctor, 6 S.E.2d 870, 876 (N.C. 1940) (Stacy, C.J.,
concurring) ("The right to conduct a lawful business, or to earn a livelihood, is regarded as
fundamental.").
310. 350 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498,
507 (N.C. 1976)). Accord State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. 1949) ("[O]rdinary lawful
and innocuous occupations of life.., must be open to all alike upon the same terms.... [T]he
legislature can neither deny nor unreasonably curtail the common right secured to all men by...
the State Constitution to maintain themselves and their families by the pursuit of the usual
legitimate and harmless occupations of life."). In Treants, the court struck down an ordinance that,
among other things, prohibited the granting of licenses to any business "providing or selling male
or female companionship" if an owner "has been convicted of a felony or of a crime involving
prostitution or related offense within the preceding five years." 350 S.E.2d at 366-67. The
ordinance also forbid such businesses to "knowingly hire a new employee who has been convicted
of a felony within three years or of prostitution, assignation, or a related offense within two years,
or is a felon whose citizenship has not been restored" or to continue to employ an existing
employee convicted of such an offense after the effective date of the ordinance. Id. at 367. The
court distinguished due process analysis under the U.S. Constitution from that under the North
Carolina Constitution, declaring that in order to comply with the law of the land clause, a "law
must have a rational, real and substantial relation to a valid governmental objective (i.e., the
protection of the public health, morals, order, safety, or general welfare)." Id. at 369-70. The
court held that the ordinance went "far beyond what is necessary" to regulate organized
prostitution (the primary rationale for the ordinance) because it "place[d] onerous burdens upon [a
host of] legitimate businesses (such as legitimate dating escort services and nursing and rest
homes). Id. at 372. Although the statute contained a severability clause, the court declined to
sever any provisions because "[a]ll parts of the statute are related to [an] unconstitutional purpose
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has not adopted strict scrutiny analysis of employment related legislation, instead
requiring that the law bear a "real and substantial" relationship to the state's
interest, 3 11 the North Carolina courts have not treated employment-related
3 12
legislation with the kind of conclusive deference applied by the federal courts.
Advocates should look for other states that have rigorously protected the right to
work, and thus provide a basis to challenge employment related collateral
sanctions. Even in states where courts analyze legislation involving employment
classifications using a highly deferential rational basis review more similar to the
federal standard such review does not necessarily lead to a conclusive
presumption that the statute is valid, but may instead require some serious
consideration of whether the legislation is substantially related to, and likely to
3 13
serve, the state's asserted interest.
C. Poverty Provisions
Unlike the federal constitution, many state constitutions explicitly impose an
obligation, or at least recognize the need, to provide public assistance based on
economic necessity. 3 14 Some constitutions "impose an affirmative duty on the
state to care for indigent residents," while others explicitly or implicitly grant the
state authority to care for the needy using varying degrees of obligatory
language. 3 15 For example, the New York Constitution specifically declares that
"[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by
such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." 3 16 Alabama's
constitution provides: "It shall be the duty of the general assembly to require the
several counties of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of

and there are no provisions which may validly be given effect." Id. at 373.
311. Treants, 350 S.E.2d at 369-70.
312. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1137 (1999) (noting that federal rationality review

asks only "whether the law is within the bounds of state legislative power").
313. See, e.g., Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. 2003). Nixon defines

Pennsylvania's rational basis test as follows: "a law 'must not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive, or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the means which it employs must have

a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained'

(quoting Gambone v.

Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954)).
314. See Rava, supra note 154, at 551, 569-77 (finding that twenty-three state constitutional

provisions impose some obligation to provide assistance to indigent persons).
315. See id. at 553-54.

Rava groups state constitutional "poverty" provisions into four

categories: (1) Alabama, Kansas, New York, and Oklahoma impose an affirmative duty on the
state to provide assistance for those in need; (2) the Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and

Texas Constitutions expressly permit state or local governments to care for the needy; (3) Alaska,
California, Hawaii, and Louisiana grant the state "the generalized power to care for the needy";
and (4) "Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,

Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming all contain implied grants of constitutional authority."
Id. at 554-59.
316. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
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the poor." 3 17 As commentators have argued, these provisions require states to
subject welfare classifications to rigorous scrutiny. 3 18 While the scope of many
of these provisions has not been tested in the courts, the text of these provisions
supports the claim that the state has an obligation to care for its indigent
ban on welfare benefits or denial
residents, which is incompatible with a lifetime
3 19
of public housing because of a conviction.
New York has a well-developed jurisprudence under its poverty provision
that may indicate how other states might interpret the contours of their own
provisions. While New York has opted out of the lifetime welfare ban, it denies
public housing to those convicted of felonies. 320 New York has held that the
317. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 49.

318. See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 895 (1989). Neuborne proffers:
[O]ne can understand the reluctance of a federal judge to use the federal Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses to generate substantive floors in areas that are
wholly foreign to the federal text. Where, however, the constitutional text demonstrates
an intense substantive interest in the plight of the poor, a judge's willingness to use the
state's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to reinforce the substantive concerns
already present in the state's constitution's text should be much greater.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Hershkoff, supra note 312, at 1184 ("A state court faced with a
state constitutional welfare challenge ought to subject a legislative classification to rigorous
scrutiny to determine whether the provision is likely to effectuate the constitutional goal.").
319. States may also have created a statutory duty to care for the indigent, which can provide
another basis to challenge the welfare ban. For example, California's Welfare and Institutions
Code provides:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor,
indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident
therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends,
by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 2001).

Advocates may be able to argue that these

provisions create a duty to provide housing and welfare to individuals with criminal records,
notwithstanding the federal ban. For example, in California, where the state legislature has
adopted the welfare ban in its entirety, a court invalidated a county ordinance that barred all
persons convicted of drug-related felonies from obtaining county-funded "general relief' benefits.
Arenas v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). The court contrasted the state legislation implementing the federal ban and denying
CalWORKS benefits to persons convicted of a drug-related felony on or after December 31, 1997,
with the county ban denying benefits from the "general relief' fund to anyone "convicted of a
felony committed after August 22, 1996 for possession, use or distribution of illegal drugs,"
regardless of whether that person was ineligible for CalWORKS benefits. Id. A three-judge panel
of the court of appeals held that the county's ordinance was not authorized by, and was in direct
conflict with, Section 17000's mandate that counties support indigent residents. Id. at 850.
Furthermore, the court found the ordinance did not "'further any governmental interest necessary to effectuate the purposes of the general relief statutes."' Id. (quoting Nelson v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)). Similarly, several states have
enacted legislation that creates a right to shelter or housing. See Florence Wagman Roisman,
Establishing a Right to Housing: An Advocate's Guide, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE
RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 11, 18-29 (1992) (discussing statutory provisions creating a right to

housing). See also Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 249-50 (W. Va. 1983) (liberally
interpreting statute mandating services for "incapacitated adults" to require West Virginia's
Department of Welfare to provide shelter to indigent homeless individuals).
320. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., NEW YORK CITY POLICIES, supra note 118.
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State is constitutionally required to provide "aid, care and support of persons
in need."'32 1 New York courts carefully scrutinize challenges dealing with
322
the exclusion of a category of poor people from existing welfare programs.
The constitutional mandate "unequivocally prevents the Legislature from
simply refusing to aid those whom it has classified as needy." 323 In other

words, the legislature cannot make eligibility contingent on overly burdensome
requirements, unrelated to need.3 24 Under this rubric, the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated a provision that required individuals under the age of
twenty-one to obtain a legal disposition against the adult relative responsible for
their care in order to receive welfare benefits, 32 5 and a statute denying Medicaid
32 6
benefits to certain lawful permanent residents.
Although some argue that New York courts have not engaged in as
searching a review as the history and context of article XVII demand,3 27 this
provision offers poor people in New York more protections than under federal
law and, at a minimum, a viable possibility of relief.3 28 Advocates should seek
to convince courts in other states to adopt a similar approach and argue that a
legislative decision that completely bans anyone convicted of a drug-related
offense from receiving welfare benefits or housing denies aid to otherwise
eligible individuals based on criteria other than need, thereby triggering more
intense judicial review of the ban. In the case of the ban on welfare benefits for

321. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1977).
322. See Helen Hershkoff, Rights and Freedoms Under the State Constitution: A New Deal
for Welfare Rights, 13 ToURo L. REv. 631, 639-40 (1997). New York courts have, however, taken
a more deferential approach to questions concerning whether the state had provided adequate aid to
the poor, leading some commentators to argue that courts have not properly construed the
provision. See id. The New York Constitution affords the state broad discretion in setting benefit
levels. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238, 244 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding a regulation
placing a fixed cap on shelter allowances, and noting that the constitutional principle that the state
must provide for the needy applies "to questions of impermissible exclusion of the needy from
eligibility for benefits, not to the absolute sufficiency of the benefits distributed to each eligible
recipient"); Barie v. Lavine, 357 N.E.2d 349, 349-50 (N.Y. 1976) (upholding a regulation that
required welfare recipients to participate in a work relief program and denied them benefits for
thirty days if they failed to comply).
323. Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 452.
324. Id. (holding that a provision requiring minors to obtain final orders of disposition in
support proceedings against their parents before they could become eligible for home relief is so
onerous that it constitutes a practical deprivation of benefits in contravention of the "letter and
spirit" of the constitutional provision).
325. Id. The court recognized that the law served legitimate state interests in requiring
responsible adults to care for their minor dependents and in preventing unnecessary welfare
expenditures but found that the delays resulting from having to pursue disposition hearings and the
inability to obtain relief in some cases where an adult's whereabouts were unknown effectively
denied aid to the needy in violation of the state constitution. Id. at 451-52.
326. Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (N.Y. 2001).
327. See Hershkoff, supra note 322, at 640-51 (proposing an alternative approach to
analyzing claims under New York's poverty provision in order to fulfill the provision's promise of
a "New Deal" for welfare rights)
328. See id. at 635-37.
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ex-offenders, even the less-than-perfect standard adopted by the New York
courts may provide advocates a viable basis for widespread relief.
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v.
Novello, 329 in which the court considered the State's failure to provide Medicaid
benefits to legal immigrants, 3 30 is illustrative of the type of challenge that may
be mounted against housing and welfare restrictions under constitutional
"poverty provisions." The court noted that in New York's two-tiered Medicaid
system one tier depends upon subsidies through federal matching funds and
conformity to federal standards.33 1 The other tier, funded entirely by the state,
provides Medicaid benefits to certain residents "whose income and resources fall
below a statutory 'standard of need' and who are not otherwise entitled to
federally subsidized Medicaid."'3 32 New York had long provided state public
assistance to legal immigrants, but stopped doing so in 1997 after Congress
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA") 333 which precluded federally funded Medicaid benefits from
certain legal immigrants. 334 The court of appeals held that the provision violated
the "letter and spirit of article XVII, [section] 1 [of the New York Constitution]
by imposing on [certain lawful permanent residents] an overly burdensome
eligibility condition having nothing to do with need, depriving them of an entire
category of otherwise available basic necessity benefits." 33 5 Similarly, the
welfare ban for people convicted of drug-related felonies arguably imposes an
overly burdensome eligibility condition on needy individuals. If states insist on
maintaining the ban to protect federal funding, advocates can argue that poverty
provisions mandate that states provide welfare benefits to individuals with
felony convictions through independent state funding streams.
D. The Unique Challengeof EducationalAid Bans
Despite the existence of state constitutional provisions mandating public
education and the fact that many states have found education to be a fundamental
right under their state constitutions, these provisions will not support challenges
33 6
to restrictions on financial aid to students with felony or drug convictions.

329. 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).

330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 7, 8, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
334. Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1090-92.

335. Id. at 1093.
336. Consequently, the ban on education support, among all collateral sanctions, may benefit
most from public education and legislative advocacy. Although there is some momentum for
reform in Congress, see supra note 213, the aid ban provisions as amended by the Second Chance
Act would still deny educational opportunity and assistance to many who have paid their debt to
society and are trying to live clean lives. See Press Release, supra note 139.
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Every state constitution contains an education clause, most of which mandate
that the state provide free, public education. 3 37 The strength and language of
these clauses vary, but most require states to provide a "thorough and efficient"
or "general and uniform" education. 33 8 While these provisions have helped
ensure access to primary and secondary education, they offer little assistance for
those seeking to fund their college education because the courts have avoided
33 9
addressing whether they create any entitlement to higher education.
Many of the provisions on their face will not support challenges to
restrictions on funding for higher education. For example, the New Jersey
Constitution's education provision requires the legislature to "provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools for the instruction of all children in the State between the ages of five
and eighteen years." 340 The Florida constitution calls upon the legislature to
ensure "adequate provision. . . for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
quality system of free public schools," but only for the "establishment,
maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning."341 Other state
constitutions require only the provision of "common schools," which has been
interpreted to apply to elementary and secondary education, excluding from the
342
analysis higher education institutions.
In states with relatively ambiguous constitutional provisions, courts have
defined the constitutional mandate in terms that do not translate to the higher

337. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARiz. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1;
IOWA CONST. art. 9, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1;
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MIsS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST.
art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1;
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art.
VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14;
R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIs. CONST. art.
10, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
338. E.g., ARIz. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("general and uniform"); MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
("thorough and efficient"); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ("thorough and efficient"); N.J. CONST.
art. VIII, § 4, 1 ("thorough and efficient"); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("general and uniform").
339. See, e.g., Richards v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 868 S.W.2d 306, 316-17
(Tex. 1993).
340. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1 (emphasis added).
341. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
342. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997) (implying
that the state's constitutional mandate covers elementary and secondary education); DeRolph
v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997) (finding that constitutional provision requiring the
provision of "common schools" applied to elementary and secondary education).
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education context.3 4 3 For example, the New York Court of Appeals, interpreting
the state constitution's education provision, concluded that a "sound basic education" required a high school education. 344 Other state courts have indicated that
the constitutional right to education does not extend beyond a high school
education. 34 5 While many state courts have held that education is a fundamental
right under their state constitutions even though it is not so under the federal
34 7
constitution, 346 this protection has not been extended to higher education.
The strongest challenges to the ban on funding for higher education will
likely be suits brought under state equal protection provisions in states where the
343. See, e.g., Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Ariz. 1997) (requiring the state to
provide financing sufficient to provide the facilities and equipment necessary to enable students to
master educational goals set by the legislature); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516, 552-53 (Mass. 1993) (looking to factors such as class size, teacher training,
adequacy of teaching of basic subjects, curriculum development, and availability of guidance
counselors to determine whether education was "adequate" under state constitution); Hoke County
Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 380-81 (N.C. 2004) (finding that the state constitution
guarantees every child an opportunity to receive a "sound basic education," defined in part as one
that provides "sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully
engage in postsecondary education or vocational training"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 337 (N.Y. 2003) (finding that the "sound basic education" mandated by
the state constitution means "a meaningful high school education"); DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 74145 (finding that state constitution requires the state to provide educational facilities in good repair,
in addition to supplies and materials); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 397 (Wis. 2000)
(holding that constitutional mandate to provide a "sound basic education" requires legislature to
take into account "districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, economically
disadvantaged students, and students with limited English language skills").
344. Campaignfor FiscalEquity, 801 N.E.2d at 337.
345. See, e,g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 110-11 & n.6 (Ala. 1993) (stating that
constitutional right to "equitable and adequate" education applies to "school-age" children); Hoke
County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 380-81 (finding that the state constitution guarantees every
child an opportunity to receive a "sound basic education," defined in part as one that provides
"sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in
postsecondary education or vocational training"); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d
1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that state must equip children for entry to college).
346. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (holding that education is a
fundamental interest under the California Constitution); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 371-73
(Conn. 1977) (holding that education is a fundamental right under the Connecticut Constitution);
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (holding that education is a fundamental right
under the Minnesota Constitution); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256-57
(N.D. 1994) (acknowledging that education is a fundamental right under the North Dakota
Constitution but declining to apply strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to state system
of funding public education); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,
333 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that education is a "matter of fundamental interest" under the Wyoming
Constitution). These cases stand in contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), a class action suit on behalf of poor
and minority students residing in school districts with low property tax bases. Id. at 4-5. After
holding that there was no federal constitutional right to education protected under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny to uphold the Texas system of
financing education. Id. at 35, 39-40.
347. See, e.g., Richards v. League of United Latin American Citizens, 868 S.W.2d 306,
316-17 (1993) (holding that the education provision of the Texas Constitution does not apply to
higher education). No court has found a fundamental right to higher education.

Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

N.YU. REVIEW OFLAW& SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 30:527

courts apply a more rigorous "rational basis" scrutiny than federal courts. 34 8 As
discussed above, advocates may bring these suits in states where courts have
applied a stringent rational basis analysis in various contexts to strike irrational
government policies and practices. For example, although Maryland courts
apply the three-tiered federal equal protection analytical framework,34 9 they
have long applied a more rigorous rational basis review than that applied under
350
the federal scheme.
Also possible is a challenge based on disparate impact in those states that
recognize the theory under their equal protection clauses. 35 1 Most jurisdictions
that deny aid to students based on criminal activity focus on convictions for
drug-related offenses. Because there is a strong correlation between race and
wealth, students of color are disproportionately reliant upon financial aid to
attend college. 35 2 Given further that many of the convictions at the state and
federal level for drug offenses are against people of color, it is likely that
education aid ban provisions have had a racially disparate impact on students of
color.
CONCLUSION

Unless we dismantle the labyrinth of collateral sanctions, it will continue to
have a devastating impact on the more than 600,000 people who are released
from prison each year, and on the communities they call home. Without the
348. See supranotes 224-30 and accompanying text.
349. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 107-13 (Md. 1992) (applying federal three
tiered equal protection analysis to claim under article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights);
Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 946 (Md. 1981) ("When evaluating an equal
protection claim grounded on Article 24, we utilize in large measure the basic analysis provided by
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the like provision contained in the fourteenth
amendment.").
350. See, e.g., Frankel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Md. Sys., 761 A.2d 324, 332-334
(Md. 2000) (applying rational basis review to strike down university policy of denying in-state
resident status to students whose primary source of monetary support resides outside of the state);
Verzi v. Baltimore County, 635 A.2d 967, 971 (Md. 1994) (noting that rational basis review under
the Maryland Constitution requires that a legislative classification "rest upon 'some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation' (quoting State Bd.
of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 312 A.2d 216, 222 (Md. 1973))); Waldron, 426 A.2d at 948-54
(striking down under rational basis review a statute prohibiting retired judges receiving
state pensions from engaging in the practice of law for compensation); Stephanie Kaye Baron,
Frankel v. Board of Regents of the University of Maryland System-In the Name of Equality: The
Proper Expansion of Maryland's Heightened RationalBasis Standard, 61 MD. L. REV. 847, 85360 (2002) (discussing cases in which the Maryland Court of Appeals has applied a more stringent
rational basis review than that applied under federal equal protection scheme).
351. See supra notes 224-76 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., DONALD E. HELLER & DOUGLASS T. SHAPIRO, HIGH-STAKES TESTING AND
STATE FINANCIAL AID: EVIDENCE FROM MICHIGAN 8 (2000), http://www.personal.psu.edu/
faculty/d/e/deh29/papers/ashe.meapOO.pdf (stating that African American, Latino, and low-income
students are more likely to enroll in college, or change the type of institution in which they enroll,
as a result of changes in the amount of financial aid offered than are white and middle- and upperincome students).
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assistance of the social safety net or the ability to obtain an education or secure
employment, these individuals cannot realistically be said to receive a second
chance. Instead, they will find it nearly impossible to afford the basic necessities
of life and to successfully reintegrate into society.
Beyond the practical effects on recidivism and survival chances, collateral
sanctions are in essence criminal sanctions that unfairly continue to punish exoffenders for their crimes long after they have served their sentence. Although
collateral sanctions are technically classified as civil rather than criminal, they
are often viewed by those who enact them as punitive means to hold exoffenders further accountable for their actions. 353 In fact, violations of
354
postconviction restrictions often constitute a criminal offense.
In Trop v. Dulles,3 55 the U.S. Supreme Court laid out the test for
determining whether sanctions are civil or criminal.3 5 6 If the purpose of the
disability is to "reprimand the wrongdoer" or "to deter others," the law is
punitive. If the law is enacted "to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose," the law is a nonpenal regulation. 35 7 Under Trop, collateral
sanctions fail to meet the test for purely civil sanctions. This is evidenced by
both the overbreadth and the underinclusiveness of various penalties. Many
collateral sanctions bear no correlation to the crime committed. 35 8 For example,
many employment restrictions, such as restrictions preventing ex-felons from
becoming barbers, have no rational connection to the goal of protecting the
general public. Even if it were legitimate to assume that someone who was
convicted of murder cannot be trusted with a set of hair clippers, the inclusion of
all ex-offenders, irrespective of their crime and its connection to the risk
of the harm being prevented implicates dispositive overbreadth issues. 35 9 The
underinclusiveness of other sanctions demonstrates their irrationality. For
instance, one of the government's purported purposes in denying Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families to drug offenders is to prevent fraud.3 6 °
However, if this were the government's true motivation, then other offenders
with a higher risk, such as those actually convicted for fraud, would also be
353. Demleitner, Collateral Damage, supra note 22, at 1032.
354. See id. at 1047.
355. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
356. Id. at 96.
357. Id.
358. See Demleitner, Collateral Damage, supra note 22, at 1028 (noting that most collateral
sanctions are counterproductive).
359. As one commentator asked:
Is the prohibition on barbering based on a fear of permitting former offenders to handle
a straight edge razor? And if so, did legislators at the time of enactment actually
believe that someone convicted of tax fraud or auto theft was a threat with a razor? Or
that former offenders who wanted to use sharp knives would have no other means of
obtaining them?
Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 16, at 1493.
360. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 431 (7th Cir. 2000).
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included in the ban. Appreciating the uselessness of these restrictions, their
essential nature comes out: these sanctions are simply another layer of
36
punishment. 1
To eradicate these policies, legal advocates should mount a comprehensive
litigation attack coordinated with legislative and public education efforts. In
light of inhospitable federal jurisprudence and the willingness of state courts to
protect civil rights and civil liberties under their own constitutions, the most
effective litigation strategy will focus on state law theories. Beginning with
equal protection, due process, and poverty provisions, advocates should seek to
implement this strategy in states that have broadly interpreted their constitutions
and have imposed a myriad of collateral sanctions.

361. See Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 4, at 154 ("Sweeping,
automatically imposed restrictions, which are reminiscent of mandatory sentences, should be
abolished since they are unnecessarily punitive.").
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